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PIAUSIBILITY PLEADING
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER*

Abstract: Last Term, in Bell Atlantic Cmp. v. Twombly, the U.S. Supreme

Court dramatically reinterpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2),
which requires a "short and plain" statement of a plaintiffs claim. The
Court was unabashed about this change of course: it explicitly abrogated a
core element of its 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson, which until recently
was the bedrock case undergirding the idea that ours is a system of notice
pleading in which detailed facts need not be pleaded. Departing from this
principle, the Court in Twombly required the pleading of facts that demon
strate the plausibility of the plaintiffs claim. This Article explicates and of
fers a critique of the Court's new jurisprudence of plausibility pleading.
The Court's new understanding of civil pleading obligations does not
merely represent an insufficiently justified break with precedent and with
the intent of the drafters of Rule 8. It is motivated by policy concerns more
properly vindicated through the rule amendment process, it places ap un
due burden on plaintiffs, and it will permit courts to throw out claims be
fore they can determine their merit. Ultimately, the imposition of plausibil
ity pleading further contributes to the civil system's long slide away from its
original liberal ethos towards an ethos of restrictiveness more concerned
with efficiency and judicial administration than with access to justice.
I fear that every age must /,earn its l,esson that special pleading cannot be
made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants
are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings . . .
-Charles E. Clark1
INTRODUCTION

Notice pleading is dead. 2 Say hello to plausibility pleading. In a
startling move by the U.S. Supreme Court, the seventy-year-old liberal
* Copyright© 2008 A. Benjamin Spencer, Visiting Professor of Law, Washington & Lee
University School of Law (assuming position with tenure July 2008); Associate Professor of
Law, University of Richmond School of Law. JD., Harvard Law School; M.Sc., London
School of Economics; B.A., Morehouse College. I would like to thank Washington & Lee
for the generous grant assistance that enabled this research. I would also like to thank
those who were able to give helpful comments on the piece, including Stephen Burbank,
Scott Dodson, and Richard Marcus.
1 Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957).
2 A similar pronouncement has been made by another commentator. See Scott Dodson,
Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 121, 124 (2007),
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf.
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pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2) has been
decidedly tightened (if not discarded) in favor of. a stricter standard
requiring the pleading of facts painting a "plausible" picture of liability.
In 2007, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 3-a case involving allegations of
wrongdoing under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act-the Su
preme Court wrote that "(fl actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level," thus moving a claim across
"the line between possibility and plausibility. "4 These statements are
quite at odds with the Court's position heretofore, represented most
clearly in the classic 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson,5 in which the Court
intoned, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claim
ant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim"6 and "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."7 Nevertheless,
the Twombly Court determined that Conley's admonition had outlived its
usefulness and thus dismissed its "no set of facts" language from the
realm of citable precedent by stating, "(A]fter puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. "8
Although the Court's move in this direction is consistent with long
held sentiment among the lower federal courts,9 the Twombly decision
represents a break from the Court's previous embrace of notice plead
ing. Several questions emerge in the wake of such a remarkable depar
ture from established doctrine. What is plausibility pleading and how is
it distinguished from its more liberal predecessor? Is the Court's inter
pretation of Rule 8 accurate (or at least defensible) or has the Court
effectively rewritten the rule? Was the Court right to reinterpret Rule 8
as it did given the language and history of the Federal Rules? Do sound
policy reasons support the imposition of plausibility pleading? Should
3 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
Id. at 1965, 1966.
5 355 U.S. 41 (1957), al!rogated by Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
6 ld. at 47.
1 Id. at 45--46; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("Given the
Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, '[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it
is clear that no relief could be granted under any set offacts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations.'" (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984))).
8 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
9 Christopher Fairman has done an excellent job collecting cases from across the years
that favored heightened pleading outside of the circumstances covered by Rule 9(b). See
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 AR1z. L. REv. 987, 1011-59 (2003)
(discussing the heightened pleading standards imposed among the circuits for various
types of claims, including antitrust, civil rights, RICO, conspiracy, and defamation claims).
4
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the Court have reli�d on the formal rules amendment process rather
than judicial interpretation to effect this change in federal civil plead
ing standards? 10 What are the likely implications of plausibility pleading
for plaintiffs? These questions and others are explored below.
This Article offers a thorough examination of the Court's new
plausibility pleading standard and concludes that it is an unwarranted
interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with
valid claims to get into court. Indeed, the Court's new standard is a di
rect challenge to the liberal ethos of the Federal Rules more generally.
In the wake of the tightening of summary judgment standards11 and a
narrowing of the scope of discovery, 12 as well as the advent of strong
judicial case management, 13 the Twombly decision has dealt what may be
a death blow to the liberal, open-access model of the federal courts es
poused by the early twentieth century law reformers. 14 A judicial ad
ministration model, or what one may term a "restrictive" or "efficiency
oriented" ethos, now seems firmly established in its place.
Part I of this Article provides a brief sketch of the state of pleading
doctrine pre-Twombly. 15 Part II analyzes the Twombly opinion, breaking
out the essential aspects of plausibility pleading and scrutinizing the
Court's rationale for tightening pleading standards. 16 Part II also ex
plores the question of whether the Court has truly abandoned notice
pleading and whether Twombly's impact might be confined to antitrust
cases.17 Part III presents a critique of plausibility pleading, both from an
interpretive perspective and from a policy perspective. 18 Part IV con
cludes with a vision of what pleading doctrine under the Federal Rules
10 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that different pleading standards "must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation").
11 See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
12 In 2000, Rule 26 was amended to limit the scope of discovery to any matter relevant
to the "claim or defense of any party" rather than the "subject matter" involved in the ac
tion. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments.
13 Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to permit courts to formulate and simplify the issues
in a case and eliminate frivolous claims or defenses. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c) (1) advisory
committee's note to the 1983 amendments.
14 For a very useful account of the efforts of the early twentieth century civil procedure
reformers, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 943-75 (1987).
15 See infra notes 20-53 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 54-131 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 132-156 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 157-300 and accompanying text.
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should look like, presenting a standard referred to as functional pkad
ing, under which a complaint is judged at the pleading stage solely by
its successful fulfillment of specific instigation, framing, and limited
filtering functions. 19
I.

PLEADING PRE-TWOMBLY: NOTICE PLEADING

Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, notice pleading has been the watchword for the system of plead
ing in federal civil courts. Supplanting the cumbersome and inelegant
code pleading system20 that required the pleading of "ultimate facts"
rather than mere "evidentiary facts" or "conclusions,''2 1 the Federal Rules
ushered in a simplified pleading system in which all that was needed
was "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief."22 This simplified approach to pleading was part of
a liberal ethos pervading the rules more generally, an ethos in which, as
Professor Richard L. Marcus has succinctly described, "the preferred
disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through
discover y. "23
U oder the new rules, pleadings were no longer to be a substan
tial hurdle to be overcome before plaintiffs could gain access to the
courts. Rather, the complaint simply would initiate the action and no
tify the parties and the court of its nature24 while subsequent stages of
the litigation process would enable the litigants to narrow the issues
and test the validity and strength of asserted claims. As Charles E.
See infra notes 301-315 and accompanying text.
The code pleading system itself supplanted the common law pleading system, which
Charles E. Clark once described as, in part, "a system of specialized allegation which has
always been viewed as the glory of the technician and the shame of the lover of justice."
Charles E. Clark,Simplified P/,eading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943).
21 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND P ROCE
DURE§ 1216 (3d ed. 2004).
22 Frn. R. CIV. P. 8 (a) (2).
23 Richard L. Marcus, The Reuival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433,439 (1986).
24 Charles Clark explained the proper understanding of notice pleading as follows:
19

20

It cannot be defined so literally as to mean all the details of the parties'
claims, or else the rule is no advance. The notice in mind is rather that of the
general nature of the case and the circumstances or events i1pon which it is
based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the oppo
nent of the affair or u·ansaction to be litigated-but not of details which he
should ascertain for himself in preparing his defense-and to tell the court of
the broad outlines of the case.
. Clark, supra note 20, at 460-61.
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Clark-a key architect of the Federal Rules and reporter of the com
mittee. that drafted the rules-put it when writing in defense of the
new rules:
[T]hrough the weapons of discovery and summary judgment
we have developed new devices, with more appropriate penalties to aid in matters of proof, and do not need to force the
pleadings to their less appropriate function .... Th�re is cer
tainly no longer reason to force the pleadings to take the
place of proof, and to require other ideas than simple concise
statements, free from the requirement of technical detail.25
Although there was early resistance among bench and bar to the
simplified pleading system of the Federal Rules, 26 the U.S. Supreme
Court gave a clear endorsement of the system in 1957, in Conley v. Gib
son.27 Conley laid the foundation for pleading doctrine, affirming that
the new regime imposed by the Federal Rules left only the notice
giving function intact.28 Although such notice had to include both the
nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests, the Court
definitively stated that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim."29 Further, the Court indicated that complaints should not
be dismissed unless it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."30
The immediate effect of Conley �as to put an end to the murmurs of

25 Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying
Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977

(1937).
26 For example,the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference adopted a resolution proposing
that Rule S(a)(2) be amended to read, "(2) a short and plain statement of the claim show
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement shall contain the facts constitut
ing a cause of action." Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Ru/Rs of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253,253 (1953). Richard Marcus does
a good job of describing some of this resistance. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 445; see also
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21,§ 1216 (describing resistance to the rule).
27 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated lTJ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007).
28 Id. at 47. In fact, it was the Conley Court that coined the term "notice pleading." Id.
'29 Id.
� Id. at 45-46. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), the famous decision authored by Charles E. Clark, father of the
Federal Rules, when he was a judge serving on the Second Circuit. Conley , 355 U.S. at 46
n.5.
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opposition to the new pleading standard of the Federal Rules and to
clarify that yes, the new liberal rules mean what they say. 31
Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court never wavered from
these principles. Although the Court made some statements that could
be read as challenges to the pure notice pleading standard announced
in Conley,32 there can be no doubt that the Court's binding precedents
speaking directly to the issue remained committed to the doctrine in its
original form. 33 Two cases reflected the Court's continued and unani
mous commitment to the liberal notice pleading ideal initially laid
down in Conley. First, in 1993, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Jyarcotics
31 See Richard L. Marcus, The Puz.z.ling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX . L. REv.
1 749, 1 750 (1 998) (" [T] his decision [ Conley] was apparently intended to put the mau:er of
deciding cases on the pleadings to rest, and proposals to tighten the pleading rules
ceased.").
32 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) ('The petitioners . . . allege no actual
facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived of a minimally adequate
education."); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 565 n.13 (1984) ('The adequacy of these
conclusory averments of intent is far from certain. The Coun of Appeals, however, found
the complaint sufficient."); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 1 47, 149 n.3
(1 984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that
the pleadings 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)); Associated Gen. Contrac
tors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.1 7 (1983) ("Cer
tainly in a case of this magnitude, a district co_urt must retain the power to insist upon
some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed.").
Christopher Fairman offers a brief mention of this point as well. See Fairman, supra
note 9, at 997 ("The Court's rigid defense of notice pleading and Rule 8 is not always so
clear. There is certainly dicta, as well as separate opinions, showing support for greater
fact-based pleading." (citations omitted)).
One could also cite the 1998 Supreme Court case Crawford-El v. Britton as a nod in fa
vor of requiring more detailed fact pleading. 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998). In that case,
however, requiring the plaintiff to provide more detail was merely an accommodation
allowed for the protection of qualified immunity claims:
v\'hen a plaintiff files a complaint against a public official alleging a claim that
requires proof of wrongful motive, the trial court must exercise its discretion
in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense. . . .
Thus, the court may insist that the plaintiff "put forward specific, nonconclu
sory factual allegations" that establish improper motive causing cognizable in
jury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judg
ment.

Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
33 Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998) ("Our decisions remain binding
precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have
raised doubts about their continuing vitality.").
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Intelligence & Coordination Unit, handed down over thirty years after
Conley, the Supreme Court provided a brief but unambiguous reaf
firmation of the Conley decision. 34 It was critical to do so at the time be- ·
cause the lower federal courts had .increasingly embraced heightened
pleading standards for certain types of claims without shame. 35 It was
thus in response to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's
heightened pleading standard for municipal liability cases36 that the
Supreme Court in Leatherman wrote, "We think that it is impossible to
square the 'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit
in this case with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the
Federal Rules."37 After quoting Conley's admonition that the Federal
Rules "do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim,"38 the Leatherman Court added that the fact
that Rule 9(b) imposes heightened pleading in two specific instances
means that all other matters are subject only to the ordinar y, liberal
standard of Rule 8. 39 For good measure, the Court admonished the
lower courts that they were not empowered to impose pleading stan
dards that varied from those required by the Federal Rules. Rather, dif
ferent pleading standards "must be obtained by the process of amend
ing the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."40 Until such
time, said the Court, "federal courts and litigants must rely on summary
judgment and control of discover y to weed out unmeritorious claims
sooner rather than later. "4 1
The Supreme Court's rejection of heightened pleading in Leather
man, however, was apparently too tepid to be taken by lower courts as a
broad admonition against applying heightened pleading under any
circumstances not covered by Rule 9(b) because lower courts contin34
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S:
163, 168 (1993).
35 See fairman, supra note 9, at 1011-59.
36 This heightened pleading standard was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in 1985, in Elliott v. Perez, and described in that case as follows:

In cases against governmental officials involving the likely defense of immu
nity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiffs complaint
state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which neces
sarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the de
fense of immunity.
751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985).
37 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
38 Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 168-69.
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ued to impose heightened pleading in many cases. 42 Thus, in 2002, in
Swierkiewicz v. Sarerna N.A., the second case to revisit heightened plead
ing, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: imposing
heightened pleading is impermissible beyond the two circumstances
identified in Rule 9(b) . 43 Specifically, the Court wrote, "Rule 8(a) 's
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited ex
ceptions. Rule 9(b) , for example, provides for greater particularity in
all averments of fraud or mistake. This Court, however, has declined to
extend such exceptions to other contexts. "44 The Court went further,
however. Without hesitation, it reasserted the Conky rule that dismissal
is only appropriate in the most extreme case: "Given the Federal Rules'
simplified standard for pleading, ' [a] court may dismiss a complaint
only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the allegations."'45 Under such a
standard, whether the possibility of recovery is likely or remote was
rendered irrelevant;46 what mattered was whether the statement of the
claim gave the defendant "fair notice" of the claim and its basis. 47
Synthesizing the cases, the key aspects of pleading doctrine pre
Twombly were fourfold. First, the statement of the claim in the com
plaint served a notice function, informing the defendant of the claim
and its basis. 48 Second, and relatedly, factual detail was unnecessary at
the pleading stage; 49 subsequent phases of the litigation would elicit
such details and frame the issues in the case. 50 Third, only certainty of
42

Christopher Fairman also discusses and cites to this group of cases. See Fairman, su-

pra note 9, at 1011-59.

534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
Id. at 513 (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
46 Id. at 515 ("Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a
claim will succeed on the merits. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." (citation and internal quota
tion marks omitted)).
47 Id. at 512 ("Such a statement must simply 'give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
48 See, e.g., Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) ("Under Rule 8(a), applicable to
ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint need only provide ' fair notice of what the plain
tiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 4 7)).
49 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 ("[T ] he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."); see also Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 n.15 (1987) ("Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent had no duty to set out all of the relevant facts in his
complaint.").
50 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("[S]implified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the
43

44
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the absence of a claim warranted dismissal; when one could say that it
remained possible for the plaintiff to adduce facts that could prove
liability, dismissal was inappropriate. 51 Finally, the pleadings were not
the proper vehicle for screening out unmeritorious claims. Rather,
other pretrial procedures-namely broad discovery52 and summary
judgment-were the proper vehicles for ferreting out claims lacking
merit. 53 As expounded in the next Part, each of these pillars of notice
pleading were called into doubt by Twombly.
II. PLEADING I N THE WAKE OF TWOMBLY: PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly in the context of an action asserting liability under section 1
of the Sherman Act. 54 The plaintiffs, William Twombly and Lawrence
Marcus, filed a complaint on behalf of a putative class consisting of
"subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet services
. . . frqm February 8, 1996 to present. "55 The defendants in the case
were a group of regional telephone service monopolies created in the
wake of the AT&T divestiture (referred to as incumbent local ex
change carriers ( "ILECs") ) who, under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, were subjected to a host of duties designed to facilitate the
entry of competitors (referred to in the case as competitive local ex
change carriers ( "CLECs") ) into the local market. 56
The defendants were accused of conspiring to stifle CLEC compe
tition thereby restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act in two
ways. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs "engaged in parallel
Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues.").
51 Id. at 45-46 ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief. "); see also Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73 ("A court may
dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the allegations.").
52 Hickman v. Taylor,329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("We agree, of course, that the deposi
tion-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of .'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
facts underlying his opponent's case."), superseded in part by FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3) .
53 Swierkier.vicz,, 534 U.S. at 514 (stating that "claims lacking merit may be dealt with
through summary judgment under Rule 56"); Leatherman, 5Q7 U.S. at 168-69 (stating that
"federal courts and litigants mus( rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to
weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later").
54 127 S. Ct. 1955,1962 (2007).
55
56

Id.
Id. at 1961.
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conduct in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart
CLECs. "57 The defendants' conduct "allegedly included making unfair
agreements with the CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing in
ferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways
designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their own customers. "58
Second, the plaintiffs charged that ILECs restrained trade by agreeing
not to compete with one another. 59 These agreements were to be in
ferred from the ILECs' common failure to meaningfully pursue attrac
tive business opportunities in certain markets and from a statement of
the chief executive officer of the ILEC Qwest that competing in the ter
ritory of another ILEC "'might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but
that doesn't make it right."'60 The plaintiffs summed up their claim as
follows:
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants entered into a contract, com
bination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their
respective local telephone and/or high speed internet ser
vices markets by, among other things, agreeing not to com
pete with one another and to stifle attempts by others to com
pete with them and otherwise allocating customers and
markets to one another. 61
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dis
missed the complaint because it read it to allege mere conscious paral
lelism, which taken alone did not state a claim under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. As the district cour.t explained, "Plaintiffs have . . . not
alleged facts that suggest[] that refraining from competing in other
territories as CLECs was contrary to defendants' apparent economic
interests, and consequently have not raised an inference that their ac
tions were the result of a conspiracy. "62 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, however, because it concluded that the
district court applied the wrong standard. Applying the Supreme
Court's "no set of facts" language from the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson,
the Second Circuit held that for dismissal to be appropriate, "a court
51 Id.
5s Id.
59 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961.
60 Id. (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ,r 42, Twombly v. Bell

Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220)).
61 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 1 4, Two mbly, 313 F. Supp. 2d
174
(No. 02 Civ. 10220).
62 Two mbly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 188, vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007).
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would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence."63
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit by holding that
"stating [a section l] claim requires a complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made."64 The
sections that follow describe how the Court reached this conclusion
and the contours of the pleading doctrine that the Court articulated in
the process.
A. Plausibility Pleading: Pleading "Suggestive " Facts

The most striking aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Twombly is its insistence that a complaint must allege facts that render
the liability asserted "plausible."65 The Court got to this point by start
ing with Conley's statement that Rule 8 (a) (2) "requires only 'a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re
lief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests."'66 The Court took the key word
in this excerpt to be "grounds." Thus, although "detailed factual allega
tions" are not necessary, the Court stated that "a plaintiffs obligation to
provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle [ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do. "67 The Court elaborated by referring to
Rule 8 (a) (2) , which requires a "showing" rather than a mere assertion
of entitlement to relief.68 For the Court, providing "grounds" "showing
. . . entitlement to relief' meant that factual allegations were essential in
a complaint: 'Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is
hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing
not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on
which the claim rests. "69
Although the Court is correct that some facts will by necessity ap
pear in a complaint, the Court's attempt to assign centrality to factual
63 Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,425 F.3d 99,114 (2d Cir. 2005), reu 'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007).
64 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
65 Id. at 1974.
66 Id. at 1964 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955).
67 Id. at 1964-65.
68 Id. at 1965 n.3.
69 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3.
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allegations in the complaint is a new and dubious step. Requiring fac
tual allegations that make a "showing . . . of entitlement to relief' runs
counter to the understanding of the original drafters of the rules70 that
in order to state a claim of liability, conclusory legal allegations coupled
with skeletal, contextual facts would suffice and detailed fact pleading
would no longer be required. 71 Although it is true that something more
than "labels and conclusions" is required--complaints reading simply
"defendant committed a tort" or "defendants violated the Sherman
Act," for example, would be completely inadequate-the Official
Forms in the Appendix to the Federal Rules do endorse the use of con
clusory legal allegations to a certain extent. 72 Former Form 9, now
Form 1 1 , itself identifies the date and location of the alleged collision
but relies on the conclusory term "negligently " to assert liability. 73 Thus,
the type of skeletal facts contemplated by the Official Forms needed
only to convey a general sense of the transaction, occurrence, act or
omission, and so forth, that was being alleged as the basis for the claim
so that responding parties and the court would have an understanding
of what the plaintiff was talking about. 74
70 In this Article, the term "drafters" refers to the members of the Committee that
drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Committee included former
Attorney General William Mitchell as Chair and Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law
School, as Reporter. For a full listing of the Committee's membership, see Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REv. 529,
534-35 & n.30 (2001).
7 1 See WRIGHT & MILLER, sup ra note 21, § 1216. Writing on the significance of "claim
for relief," Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller wrote:
Conspicuously absent from Federal Rule 8(a) (2) is the requirement found in
the codes that the pleader set forth the "facts" constituting a "cause of ac
tion." The substitution of "claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
for the code formulation of the "facts" constituting a "cause of action" was in
tended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes among "evidentiary
facts, " "ultimate facts," and "conclusions" and eliminate the unfortunate rigid
ity and confusion surrounding the words "cause of action" that had devel
oped under the codes.
Id. (citations omitted).

72 See, e.g., FED. R. C,v. P. Form 11 (alleging that "defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against . . . plaintiff'); FED. R. C1v. P. Form 9, 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) (amended
2007) (same); see also Clark, supra note 20, at 460 (speaking of "the mandate of simplicity
and directness . . . which are made real and compelling by illustrative forms showing what
this simplicity means in actual experience").
73 FED. R. C1v. P. Form 11; FED. R. C,v. P. Form 9, 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) (amended
2007).
74 Clark, sup ra note 20, at 460-61 ("The notice in mind is rather that of the general na
ture of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differenti-
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What was permitted to turn these skeletal factual allegations into
a stated claim were conclusor y labels-such as "negligently" -that
asserted wrongdoing and liability on the part of the defendant. Such
terms did not have to be unpacked element by element75 as Form 9
reveals. 76 The hypothetical pleader in Form 9 is not required to ex
plain the underlying "misdeeds-speed signals, position on the high
way, failure to look, and so on"77 that the defendant committed in
driving "negligently." Indeed, the defendant's specific misdeeds may
be reflected in facts that the plaintiff ex ante cannot know. 78 In short,
ate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be
litigated . . . and to tell the court of the broad outlines of the case.").
75 The old case of Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int 'l, Inc. provides an example:
In the instant case, it is true that Paragraph 4, of the complaint, fails to state, in
so many words, that there was a publication of the alleged slanderous utterance
and,to that extent,the cause of action is defectively stated. However, it does not
follow that the allegations do not state a claim upon which relief can be,
granted. It is alleged that plaintiff was "violently discharged" and was "falsely
and slanderously accused" of procuring for prostitution. While in a technical
sense, this language states a conclusion, it is clear tl1at plaintiff used it intending
to charge publication of the slanderous utterance and it would be unrealistic
for defendant to claim that it does not so understand the allegations . . . .
Clearly, under such allegations it reasonably may be conceived that plaintiff,
upon trial, could adduce evidence tending to prove a publication. If the provi
sions of rule 8 (a) are not to be negatived by recourse to rule 12(b), the state
ment in Paragraph 4 of the complaint must be deemed sufficient.
97 F. Supp. 5,8 (D.P.R. 1 951) (citations omitted).
76 After the restyling of the Federal Rules, Form 9 has been slightly redrafted and ap
pears as Form 11. The revised form reads, in relevant part, "On date, at place, the defen
dant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff." FED. R. C1v. P. Form 11.
77 Clark, supra note 20, at 462. In explaining the sufficiency of pleading only skeletal
facts coupled with the conclusory term "negligently" in Form 9, Clark wrote as follows:
That this affords adequate basis for res judicata is clear; plaintiff will not have
many accidents of that kind at that time and place. But to a trained mind the
kind of case it is, with respect to trial or calendar practice, is quite clear; and
there are only certain kinds and numbers of misdeeds--speed, signals, posi
tion on the highway,failure to look, and so on-which either -party can com
mit. These each party should prepare himself to face; even if they be un
stated,a wise counsel will not face trial without considering their contii:igency.
78 Although an injured plaintiff may, prior to discovery, know certain facts-for exam
ple, that the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the road-there are others that
the plaintiff cannot know-such as the defendant's speed, whether the defendant was
required but failed to wear his spectacles, or whether the vehicle suffered from some mal
function. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wvo. LJ. 177, 183 (1958)
(" [The level of detail in Form 9) isn't something a lawyer is going to feel unduly pressed
for, as he would as to such details as speed,defective headlights, and the like. He may not
know all those details.").
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no factual allegations that would show the "grounds" for an allegation
of negligence had to be pleaded; the assertion that the defendant
acted "negligently " itself stated the claim. The Court's not-so-subtle
effort to shift the need for factual allegations into the heartland area
of the elements of legal "labels and conclusions" -for example, facts
pertaining to duty and breach in a negligence claim-is something
that should be noted.
But the Twombly Court did much more than simply endorse the
idea that a complaint must contain factual allegations. It held that the
factual allegations must paint a plausible picture of liability, a notion
that the Court had never suggested in the past. Specifically, the Court
wrote: "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . "79 In the antitrust
context, this means that the complaint must offer "enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement" and "identify [] facts that are suggestive enough to
render a § 1 conspiracy plausible. "80 Applied in Twombly, this standard
meant that the complaint was insufficient:
Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy,
and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidenti
fied point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.
Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in or
der to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that
raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely par
allel conduct that could just as well be independent action.81
What becomes apparent then is that the Court is reading Rule
S(a) (2) not only to require the pleading of facts that state the claim,
but the pleading of facts that demonstrate the plausibility of a claim.
Such a system of plausibility pleading requires that the complaint set
forth facts that are not merely consistent with liability ; rather, the facts
must demonstrate "plausible entitlement to relief. "82 Elsewhere the
Court indicated that plausibility pleading requires that the complaint
make a "showing of a 'reasonably founded hope' that a plaintiff would

79 Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. at 1965 (citations omitted).

Id.
Id. at 1966.
82 Id. at 1 967.
80

81
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be able to make a case. "83 The Twombly Court explained this require
ment in the section 1 context as follows:
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly sug
gesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the
threshold requirement of Rule S (a) (2) that the "plain state
ment" possess enough heft to "sho [w] that the pleader is enti
tled to relief. " A statement of parallel conduct, even· conduct
consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the
agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; without that fur
ther circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an
account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral
territory. An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the
complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further
factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possi
bility and plausibility of "entitle [ment] to relief."84
Thus, a plaintiff may no longer survive a motion to dismiss if she
pleads facts that are equivocal, meaning the allegations are consistent
both with the asserted illegality and with an innocent alternate expla
nation. The Court made this clear at several points in its opinion.
First, the Court wrote, " [W] hen allegations of parallel conduct are set
out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that
raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel
conduct that could just as well be independent action. "85 Later in the opin
ion, the Court reiterated this sentiment by asserting that parallel con
duct was not suggestive of conspiracy because "sparse competition
among large firms dominating separate geographical segments of the
market could very well signify illegal agreement, but here we have an
obvious alternative explanation."86 Thus it seems that under plausibil
ity pleading, a complaint that sets forth facts painting a picture that is
equally consistent with liability and nonliability will not suffice.87
The problem with this view of Rule S (a)-the view that a "showing
. . . of entitlement to relief' requires the pleading of suggestive facts
83 Id. at 1 969 (citation omitted).
84 Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. at 1 966 (citation omitted).
85 Id. (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 1972.
87 Id. at 1 964 (" [P] arallel conduct or interdependence . . . [is] consistent with conspir
acy, but [is] just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.").
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rendering liability plausible-is that it significantly raises the pleading
bar beyond where Conley had placed it long ago.BB Conley spoke of "the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re
lief. "89 This statement was rooted in and consistent with the even more
established rule concerning the treatment of motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim that obligates courts to assume the truth of the
plaintiffs factual allegations and to draw all inferences in the plaintiffs
favor.90 The Supreme Court has stated this latter rule thusly :
The plaintiff was not bound to have joined in the demurrer
without the defendant's having distinctly admitted, upon the
record, every fact which the evidence introduced on his be
half conduced to prove; and that when the joinder was made,
without insisting on this preliminary, the Court is at liberty to
draw the same inferences in favour of the plaintiff, which the
jury might have drawn from the facts stated. The evidence is
taken most strongly against the party demurring to the evi
dence. This is the settled doctrine in this Court . . . . 91
A plausibility requirement at the pleading stage that rejects equivocal
allegations is inconsistent with this tradition. The Court in Twombly ex
pressly stated that allegations that are "merely consistent with" liability
leave only a depiction that "stays in neutral territory " and "stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility."92 Under the traditional
rule, factual allegations that were consistent with liability passed muster
because courts were required to draw any permissible inferences in the
plaintiffs favor, permissible here meaning those inferences simply con-

88 Id. at 1965 n.3.
89 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
90 See, e.g., Cal. P ub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.
2004) ("A motion to dismiss pursuant to [FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6)] may be granted only if,
accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable
factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would warrant relief.").
91 Columbian Ins. Co. v. Catlett, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 383, 389 (1827). Circuit courts
have articulated the rule as obligating courts to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff. See, e.g. , Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005)
("On review of a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, we accept the facts alleged in the complaint as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.").
92 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
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sistent with the stated allegations.93 Thus, in the Twombly case, the
courts should have been able-at the pleading stage-to infer from
parallel conduct and the lack of competition among the ILECs, cou
pled with the statement of one of the ILEC presidents regarding the
impropriety of such competition, that there was some agreement
among the ILECs to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.94
This is especially so given the Court's own acknowledgement that "a
showing of parallel 'business behavior is admissible circumstantial evi
dence from which the fact finder may infer agreement. "'95 At a mini
mum, it could not be said in the face of such allegations that the plain
tiff would not be able to prove any set of facts that would establish
liability.
The inconsistency of plausibility pleading with the tradition of
drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiff on a motion to dismiss and
Conley s "no set of facts" language obligated the Court to take the
dramatic step of abrogating the very statement from Conley that stood
in its way. 96 The Court rejected the language by citing to the criticism
the statement has received from courts and commentators, stating
that " Conley's 'no set of facts' language has been questioned, criti
cized, and explained away long enough" and that "this famous obser
vation has earned its retirement. ''97 Obviously, this is an insufficiently
articulated justification for rejecting a fifty-year-old statement provid
ing the bedrock understanding of the general pleading standard in
our system. I critique this aspect of the opinion in detail below.98 The
point to understand here is that the Court's rejection of Conley's "no
set of facts" standard is a clear indication of the fact that the Court's
plausibility pleading is a new, more stringent pleading standard that
deprives plaintiffs the benefits of inferences in their favor when the
pleaded facts are consistent with alternate explanations that do not
involve wrongdoing.99
93 Any higher standard for "permissive" -for example, one that only permits plausible
inferences---would stray from the notice-giving purpose of pleading into the realm permit
ting more onerous screening at the pleading stage. It is my contention that such scrutiny
inappropriately moves forward summary judgment-like screening to the pleading phase.
See infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text.
94 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962.
95 ld. at 1964 (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954)).
96 See id. at 1969.
91 Id.
98 See infra notes 159-195 and accompanying text.
99 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 ("[W]hen allegations of parallel conduct are set out
in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a
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B. The Zones ofPleading
The Twombly Court distinguished plausibility pleading from its
predecessor by describing three zones of pleading. 100 That is, in the
Court's pleading schema, there are three different zones into which
one's pleading may fall, with the third alone being sufficient. The first
zone consists of largely conclusory pleading. 101 The second zone con
sists of factually neutral pleading. 1 02 The third zone consists of factu
ally suggestive pleading. 103 Only those complaints that plead facts sug
gestive of liability satisfy the Rule S (a) obligation to state a claim that
shows entitlement to relief. 1 04
The Court first suggested the idea of distinct pleading zones
when it spoke of the "line" between possibility and plausibility: "An
allegation of parallel conduct . . . gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitle [ment] to re
lief. "'105 In support of this statement, the Court offered a reference to
the U.S Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's 1999 case, DM Research,
Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 106 and then elaborated on the
reference as follows: 'The border in DM Research was the line between
the conclusory and the factual. Here it lies between the factually neu
tral and the factually suggestive. Each must be crossed to enter the
realm of plausible liability." 107 It is here then that the existence of
three distinct zones of pleading separated by two thresholds becomes
clear. There is a threshold between conclusory pleading and factual
pleading that supports the possibility of a claim but could also support
a scenario not involving liability. The second threshold is between
such "factually neutral" pleading and the "factually suggestive, " the
latter moving the claim from being merely possible to plausible. Fig
ure 1 illustrates these zones. 1 08
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent
action.").
1 00 Id. n.5.
IOI Id.
rn2 Id.
103 Id.
1o4 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
rn, Id.
105 1 70 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999).
1 07 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 n.5.
108 This illustration merely intends to represent the Twombly Court's apparent pleading
schema, not to challenge or supplant Christopher Fairman's useful figure of the pleading
circle. See Fairman, supra note 9, at 998 (showing pleading to be a ci1-cular continuum from
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Figure 1 : The Zones of Pleading
Conclusory Zone
(insufficient)

Neutral Zone
(insufficient)

No facts breaking down.
le!!al conclusions alletzed.

Facn1al allegations are
pleaded but those facts
are consistent both with
liability and with innocent
alternative explanations.

Zone of Plausibility
(sufficient)
Facts are alleged that
paint a plausible picture
of liability thereby
"showing" that the
pleader is "entitled to
relief."

How may a plaintiff seeking to assert liability under the Sherman
Act get its pleadings into the zone of plausibility when it is relying on
allegations of parallel anticompetitive and noncompetitive conduct?
In Twombly, the Court indicated that it is possible to make parallel
conduct allegations that would state a claim by offering the following
cursory explanation:
Commentators have offered several examples of parallel
conduct allegations that would state a § 1 claim under this
standard. See, e.g., 6 Areeda & Hovenkamp ,r 1 425, at 1 67185 (discussing "parallel behavior that would probably not
result from chance, coincidence, independent responses to
common stimuli, or mere interdependence unaided by an
advance understanding among the parties") ; Blechman,
Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices:
The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws,
24 N.YL. S. L. Rev. 881 , 899 (1 979) (describing "conduct
[ that] indicates the sort of restricted freedom of action and
sense of obligation that one generally associates with agree
ment") . The parties in this case agree that "complex and his
torically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made
at the very same time by multiple competitors, and made for

wholly conclusory pleading to prolix pleading, both of which would be inappropriate un
der Rule 8). Fairman offers "I want you to answer in tort" as an example of a completely
conclusory allegation to which a defendant could not respond. See id. at 999. On the unde
sirability of prolix pleading, see Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Fed 'n, 836 F.2d 1 063, 1068 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("It is not only unnecessary but also undesirable to plead facts beyond limning
the nanire of the claim . . . . Bloated, argumentative pleadings are a bane of modern prac
tice.").
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no other discernible reason " would support a plausible i n
ference of conspiracy. 109
However, it is not clear how outside of these not-so-well-described cir
cumstances a plaintiff relying on parallel conduct can make it past the
pleading stage to determine whether there is indeed evidence of an
agreement. Thus, it seems that the Court in reality held that the addi
tional evidence that will be required at trial (and at the summary
judgment stage) to prove an agreement based on parallel conduct
evidence that must tend to exclude the possibility of independent ac
tion 1 10-must be alleged at the pleading stage. In effect, then, the
Court has moved forward the burden that plaintiffs must carry at
later stages in the litigation up front to the pleading stage.
A more general question remains respecting the Court's articula
tion of the three zones of pleading. Although these zones may aptly
classify the types of pleadings that courts may confront, the real issue
is whether the Court was correct in holding that pleadings falling
within the first two zones are insufficient under Rule 8 (a) . As will be
taken up below in Part III, the understanding of Rule 8 (a) (2) among
the drafters of the rule was that the pleadings in each of these zones
would suffice under the new liberal pleading regime, a view shared by
the Conley Court. 1 1 1

C. Pleading Policy : The Screening ofFrivolous Claims
An interesting aspect of the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of
Rule 8 (a) (2) in Twombly is its explicit and unabashed reliance on poli
cies of efficiency and sound judicial administration to justify its new
reading of the rule.11 2 The Court explained the "practical significance"
of Rule 8 (a) (2) 's "entitlement requirement" by referring to one of its
previous pleadings decisions, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 1 1 3 a
securities fraud case decided in 2005:
[In Dura Pharmaceuticals] we explained that something be
yond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged,
lest a plaintiff with '"a largely groundless claim"' be allowed to
"'take up the time of a number of other people, with the right
Two mbly, 1 27 S. Ct. at 1966 n.4.
Id. at 1964.
1 1 1 See infra notes 1 57-300 and accompanying text.
1 1 2 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
1 13 544 U.S. 336 ( 2005).
109

110
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to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settle
ment value.'" 1 1 4
In other words, simply offering a complaint that sets forth facts that
render liability possible must be treated as insufficient given the ability
of high-dollar suits to coerce defendants into settlement in the inter
est of avoiding the expense and uncertainty of discovery. 1 1 5 As the
Court explained, "proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive"
and thus "'a district court must retain the power to insist upon some
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
controversy to proceed. "'1 1 6 After concluding that neither judicial case
management nor careful scrutiny at the summary judgment stage can
adequately weed out groundless claims, the Court stated that in the
antitrust context, "it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasona
bly fol,!nded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evi
dence' to support a § 1 claim.''1 1 7
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the Court permit
ted concerns related to efficiency and sound judicial administration to
shape its interpretation of Rule S's pleading standard.l l 8 The central
concern of the Court was the often prohibitive cost of modern large
case discovery ; it did not want plaintiffs to be able to threaten defen
dants with such costs without having to demonstrate that a plausible
claim exists at the very front-end of the system, the complaint. As the
Court explained, ''when the allegations in a complaint, however true,
could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency
should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and
11 4
115

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Dura Pharms. , 544 U.S. at 347).
See id. at 1967 ("[T] he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defen

dants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings."). Christopher Fair
man has noted that lower courts have used this rationale as a basis for imposing height
ened pleading beyond the antitrust context. See Fairman, sup ra note 9, at 1059 ("[Q] uickly
putting an end to meritless strike suits is used as a basis of heightened pleading in such
varied substantive areas as CERCLA, civil rights, conspiracy, defamation, negligence, and
RICO. This belief in categories of cases being presumptively frivolous, in itself a common
ality, also fosters deviation from notice pleading.").
116 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters,459 U.S. 519,528 n.17 (1983)).
1 1 7 Id. at 1967 (quoting Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347).
118 Id. at 1989 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (''The transparent policy concern that drives the
decision is the interest in protecting antitrust defendants-who in this case are some of the
wealthiest corporations in our economy-from the burdens of pretrial discovery.").
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money by the parties and the court. " 1 19 As this quotation reveals, the
Court is looking for the pleadings to serve a strong screening function by
eliminating groundless claims before costly discovery ensues. 120
But the Court also made several references to discovery abuse, a
phenomenon analy tically distinct from the notion of costly discovery
more generally. Beyond protecting defendants against the ordinary
costs associated with responding to proper discovery requests in an
antitrust suit against large corporations, the Court suggested that
"checking discovery abuse" is a goal it sought to achieve through the
pleading rules as well. 121 These references to discovery abuse are per
plexing because, in Twombly, there was no indication simply from the
complaint that the defendants would have been subjected to abusive,
impositional discovery requests.
Further, and more importantly, discovery abuse in the form of im
positional requests is not an evil unique to groundless or insufficiently
pleaded claims. Such abuse can occur regardless of whether the under
lying claims are legitimate or meritless, well-pleaded, or not. Although it
may be more difficult for a court to guard against impositional discov
ery requests in the context of a "sketchy complaint"1 22 offering only
skeletal factual allegations, it is not necessarily more likely that such
complaints will result in more impositional requests being made. Abu
sive, impositional discovery requests are motivated by the desire to im
pose litigation expense on one's opponent rather than the desire for
information (a practice one could curb more directly by abandoning or
modifying the American Rule rather than through pleadings deci
sions) . 1 23 There is no reason to suppose that plaintiffs filing complaints
119 Id. at I 966 (majority opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) .
120 See id.
121 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967. The Court's references to discovery abuse appear in the
following passage:

It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can,
if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through "careful
case management," given the common lament that the success of judicial su
pervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. And it is
self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by "careful
scrutiny of evidence at tl1e summary judgment stage," much less "lucid instruc
tions to juries . . . . "

Id. (citations omitted) .
122 Id. at 1967 n.6 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as A buse, 69 B.U. L. REv.

635, 638 (1989) ) .
125 See Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery A.buse Under the New Federal
Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 680, 726 (1983) ("Perhaps
the mightiest catalyst for discovery abuse is the so-called American Rule . . . . The effect of
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with factual allegations that are merely consistent with rather than sug
gestive of liability will resort to impositional discovery requests with
greater frequency than plaintiffs who cross the threshold of plausibility.
Because discovery abuse has little to do with the distinction between
plausibility pleading and conclusory notice pleading, it seems that the
Court simply raised the specter of discovery abuse as a bugbear to bol
ster its case for the need to tighten pleading standards.
On top of the idea of discovery abuse and the previously men
tioned high costs of complex litigation, the Court in Twombly alluded to
a third concern warranting tightened pleading: heavy judicial
caseloads. 1 24 The Court thus seemed to endorse the U.S Court of Ap
peals for the Seventh Clrcuit's view that "the costs of modern federal
antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts
counsel against sending the parties into discovery when there is no rea
sonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the
events related in the complaint. "1 25
Although this troika of policy concerns-litigation expense, dis
covery abuse, and overburdened caseloads-may be valid in some re
spects, the question is whether it was proper for the Court to rely on a
judicial reinterpretation of Rule S's pleading standard to vindicate
them. After all, the Court has written in the past that different, more
restrictive pleading standards, if desired, "must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpreta
tion. " 126 Such is the course of action the Court has approved in the
past, for example, when it approved the 1983 amendment of Rule 1 6:
"Given the significant changes in federal civil litigation since 1938 that
are not reflected in Rule 1 6, it has been extensively rewritten and exthis rule on discovery is profound: a party can have as much discovery as it wants by paying
only the costs of seeking that discover y ; the costs of compliance are generally borne without
recompense by the opposing party.").
124 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967. Christopher Fairman has noted that lower courts
frequently invoked docket control as a justification for imposing heightened pleading
standards. See Fairman, supra note 9, at 1060 ( "The perception of large numbers of poten
tially meritless claims clogging judicial dockets is also a familiar theme. Consequently, it is
not surprising that in many areas courts offer docket control as another justification." (ci
tations omitted)).
125 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d
1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
126 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 1 68 (1993); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ( 'To the ex
tent that the court was concerned with this procedural issue, our cases demonstrate that
questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and
most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.").
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panded to meet the challenges of modern litigation. " 127 A similar ap
proach would have been more appropriate to alter general pleading
obligations in response to new challenges presented by complex liti
gation.
The reasons for requiring recourse to the formal rule amend
ment process are several. First and most basically, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly reminded the rest of us that the only way to revise civil
pleading standards to impose more stringent pleading requirements
is to amend the rules formally. 128 But more importantly, the rule
amendment process is preferable because it is a much more democ
ratic, transparent, and accountable method of making changes to the
Federal Rules. The process by which the Civil Rules Advisory Commit
tee considers changes to the rules involves advanced notification to
the legal community of the proposed changes and the opportunity to
comment on its merits. 129 This notice and comment process shines
more light on the proposals, meaning that any politically difficult
changes will receive scrutiny and that opponents will have the oppor
tunity to voice their concerns to the Committee or ultimately to Con
gress. Such participation gives the process more legitimacy than a
change effected through judicial reinterpretation. 13° Finally, permit
ting the rulemakers to handle the process of revising federal civil
pleading standards makes more sense because they are in a position
to consider the impact any changes would have on the other rules
and the system as a whole. The Advisory Committee would also be in
a position to undertake studies in an effort to determine whether and
to what extent the problems of extortionary settlements and discovery
abuse identified by the Court do indeed exist and tailor any revision
of the rules to address the concerns confirmed by such research. 131

127 FED.

R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments.
See C rawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
129 See 28 U.S.C.§ 2073; see also J ames C. Duff, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The
Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar (Oct. 2007), http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/proceduresum.htm.
130 See C rawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
131 A similar point was made in The Supreme Court 2006 Term, Leading Cases, Pl,eading
Standards, 121 HARV. L. REv. 305, 313 (2007). For an example of such research requested
by the Advisory Committee, see generally Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman,
Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make? 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 591 (2006).
128
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D. Erickson v. Pardus: An Affirmation of Notice Pleading?
Before launching into a more systematic critique of Twombly, it is
necessary first to determine whether all of this is much ado about noth
ing. That is, has Twombly really changed pleading doctrine fundamen
tally given that the Supreme Court shortly thereafter rendered another
pleading decision in which most of the fundaments of notice pleading
were pronounced and reaffirmed?
In Erickson v. Pardus, decided in 2007, only two weeks after
Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed a pleadings dismissal that the
circuit court had affirmed in a case involving a pro se prisoner assert
ing a § 1983 daim. 132 The prisoner asserted that necessary treatment
for hepatitis C had been initiated and then wrongfully terminated by
prison officials and that such termination endangered his life. 133 The
district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the ground
that the complaint failed to allege whether the withdrawal of treat
ment exacerbated his health problems beyond the harm that the dis
ease itself would present to the prisoner. 134
The Supreme Court found dismissal in these circumstances to be
error. 135 For its analysis, the Court began by quoting the classic state
ments regarding notice pleading that were still intact after Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a) (2) requires only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Specific facts are not necessary; the state
ment need only "'give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' In addition,
when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint. 136
After this recitation, the Court reiterated the prisoner's allegations
that the doctor's decision to terminate the hepatitis C treatment en132 1 27 S. Ct. 2 197, 21 99-200 (2007).
133 Id. at 2 1 99.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2200 ("It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the allegations
in question, concerning harm caused petitioner by the termination of his medication,
were too conclusory to establish for pleading purposes that petitioner had suffered 'a cog
nizable independent harm' as a result of his 1·emoval from the hepatitis C treatment pro
gram." (citation omitted)).
136 /d. (citations omitted).
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dangered his life, that he was still in need of treatment, and that the
prison officials continued to refuse treatment. 137 According to the
Court, these allegations alone were enough to satisfy Rule 8(a) (2) . 138
The Court concluded by emphasizing that Rule 8(a) (2) sets forth
"liberal pleading standards" and that pleadings drafted by pro se liti
gants must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. "139
The Erickson Court's nod to notice pleading, coupled with its as
sertion that " [s] pecific facts are not necessary " and affirmation that
Rule 8(a) (2) sets forth "liberal pleading standards" do soften the
edges of Twombly, seeming to assure readers that not all of Conley's
legacy has been discarded. 1 40 But Erickson's brief homage to notice
pleading and the liberal ethos ring hollow in the context of this clear
cut case for two reasons. First,_ under the relevant law governing the
prisoner's claim, an Eighth Amendment violation occurs when delays
in medical treatment involve life-threatening situations and when it is
apparent that delay would exacerbate the prisoner's medical prob
lems.1 4 1 The prisoner pleaded that the termination of treatment en
dangered his life and thus it is clear that he had stated a claim. 1 42 In
deed, the prisoner's claim was plausible because he actually had
hepatitis C and the fatal consequences of nontreatment were well
documented. 143 Second, the prisoner in Erickson was proceeding pro
se, which-consistent with long-standing precedent 14"-entitled him
to less stringent scrutiny of his complaint. 1 4 5 Thus, Erickson is not a
1 37 Erickson, 1 27 S. Ct. at 2200.
1 3s 1d.
1 39 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 2199.
142 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 21 97-98. At least one other commentator has agreed that
Erickson was an easy case that cannot be used to detract from the impact of Twombly. See
Dodson, supra note 2, at 126.
1 0 E1ickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2198.
144 See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-1 0 ( 1 980) ("It is settled law that the allega
tions of [a pro se prisoner] complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded' are held 'to less strin
gent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' Such a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." (citations
omitted)).
145 Indeed, the brief petition for certiorari submitted by William Erickson, the prisoner
litigant, did not offer arguments pertaining to the interpretation and application of Rule
8 (a) ( 2) as the basis for reversing the judgment of the Tenth Circuit. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Erickson, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (No. 06-7317), available at 2006 Vl'L 4590561.
Rather, it focused on the Supreme Court's cases indicating that pro se pleaders were held
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proper case in which to test how the Court will apply Twombly in sub
sequent cases. 146
E. Is Twombly Just an Antitrust Case?
The final bit of brush clearing that must be done before moving to
the critique of Twombly is answering the question of whether Twombly is
only an antitrust case, 1 47 meaning that the Court's new pleading stan
dard will not be applied to other cases or at least will not be applied to
cases not presenting the efficiency andjudicial administration concerns
pointed to by the Court in Twombly. The short answer is no, Twombly is
not merely an antitrust case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are on their face transsub
stantive, meaning that Rule 8(a) 's pleading standard applies to all
cases regardless of their substance, save for those covered by Rule
9(b) or claims covered by a statutorily imposed heightened pleading
standard. 148 Thus, the Court cannot through judicial interpretation
impose a special pleading rule for antitrust cases that will not apply to
other cases; it can only do so through the rulemaking process. The
Twombly opinion offers an interpretation of Rule 8(a) , which it then
proceeds to apply. This interpretation of Rule 8(a) must apply to all

to a lower pleading standard. Id. The question presented on the pleading issue was: "Is a
pro-se prisoner litigant entitled to liberal construction when a United States Court reviews
his pleadings, and if so, did the lower courts abuse their discretion in Mr. Erickson's case?"
Id. The answer Erickson offered was as follows: "This Court has always held that a pro-se
prisoner litigant is entitled to liberal construction on his pro-se attempts [sic] presentation
of his claims for relief, regardless of whether those claims are civil rights violations or re
quests for habeas relief. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S 106, 113 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 79 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520--21 (1972)." Id. at 6.
146 Indeed, more telling and more relevant will be how lower courts will apply Twombly
going forward. Initial indications are that lower courts are interpreting Twombly to have
articulated a new, more stringent pleading standard that requires more than had been
required under notice pleading. See infra notes 150--152 and accompanying text.
147 This is a question several scholars have already raised. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix,
Troubling "Twombly, " NAT'L LJ., June 11, 2007, at 13 ("[W]ill Twombly's holdings be cab
ined only to Sherman Act§ 1 antitrust claims, or will the court's rulings apply to all plead
ings alleging conspiracy claims?").
148 See FED. R. C1v. P. 1 (''These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and pro
ceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81."). Scholars have
debated whether the Federal Rules shou/,d be transsubstantive. See, e.g. , Stephen B. Bur
bank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 693, 716--17 (1988) (arguing for procedural rules tailored to specific sub
stantive areas).
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claims subject to Rule 8 (a) and thus it is hard to understand how the
Twombly approach would not apply in other types of cases. 149
The reaction of lower federal courts to Twombly is instructive.
There are already hundreds of published lower federal court opinions
that have read Twombly as announcing a new pleading standard that is
generally applicable to cases in the federal system. 150 The Second Cir
cuit, for example, has shied away from the notion that Twombly is only
an antitrust case, summarizing its views as follows: 'We are reluctant to
assume that all of the language of Bell Atlantic [ v. Twombly] applies only
to section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or,
slightly more broadly, only to antitrust cases. "1 51 Indeed, the lower
149 See FED. R. C1v. P. 1.
See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-lV, L.L.G, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) ("'We
look for plausibility in th[e] complaint.'" (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970)); Haas v.
Rhody, No. 07-1021, 2007 WL 2089282, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007) ("A complaint may
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) where the complaint fails to plead 'enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974));
Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 06-2376, 2007 WL 2091167, at *1 (D. Kan. July 20, 2007)
( "[P ] laintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible-rather than
merely conceivable-on its face."); Davis v. Babish, No. 06-4638, 2007 WL 2088798, at *2
(N.D. Ill. July 20, 2007) ("[I]n order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the claim must be supported by facts that, if taken as true, at least plausibly suggest
that he is entitled to relief."). A Westlaw search in mid:January 2008 of all reported federal
court opinions revealed that at that point there were well over 3000 opinions citing
Twombly.
One district court articulated the new pleading standard under Twombly as follows:
150

Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 8(a) (2) requires only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The
United States Supreme Court has made clear, however,that a plaintiff is obli
gated to provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recita
tion of the elements of a cause of action will not do." "Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." "Rule
8(a) (2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitle
ment to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only fair
notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests."
\.\'hen the Complaint contains inadequate factual allegations, "this basic defi
ciency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time
and money by the parties and the court." "[A] district court must retain the
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially
massive factual controversy to proceed."
Dell, Inc. v. This Old Store, Inc., No. 07-0561,2007 WI.. 1958609, at *l (S.D. Tex. July 2,
2007) (citations omitted).
151 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit went on to state
in a footnote that "it would be cavalier to believe that the Court's rejection of the 'no set of
facts' language from Conley, which has been cited by fedei:a) courts at least 10,000 times in
a wide variety of contexts . . . , applies only to section 1 antitrust claims." Id. at 157 n.7. It
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courts have quickly grown quite comfortable with Twombly's plausibility
pleading standard, articulating and applying its pronouncements out
side of the antitrust context to declare borderline pleadings inade
quate. 152
Although Twombly's plausibility pleading standard does not just
apply to antitrust cases, it is probably correct to say that the standard
will be more demanding in the context of claims in which direct evi
dence supporting the wrongdoing is difficult for plaintiffs to identify
at the complaint stage. 1 53 Thus, for example, although straightforward
common law tort claims-such as those asserting conversion, battery,
or negligence-might be easy to support with suggestive facts, plain
tiffs may find that claims for which intent or state of mind is an ele
ment-such as discrimination or conspiracy claims-are more diffi
cult to plead in a way that will satisfy the plausibility standard. The
Second Circuit seemed to suggest this issue subtly when it wrote,
[T] he [Supreme] Court is not requiring a universal standard
of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexi
ble "plausibility standard," which obliges a pleader to amplify
a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible. 1 54
In other words, the Court's plausibility standard may require different
levels of factual detail depending upon the substantive context. Thus,
a complaint with an antitrust claim rooted in conspiracies based on
indirect inferential evidence will require more facts to traverse the
threshold of plausibility than would be needed in a case asserting the
conversion of personal property.
should be noted that the court in Iqbal v. Hasty reached this conclusion after acknowledg
ing that the Twombly Court sent mixed signals regarding whether its holding applied be
yond the antitrust context. See id. at 155-57. The Seventh Circuit has also indicated its view
that Twombly applies beyond the antirust context. See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir. 2007) ( "The present case is not an
antitrust case, but the district court will want to determine whether the complaint contains
'enough factual matter (taken as true)' to provide the minimum notice of the plaintiffs'
claim that the Court believes a defendant entitled to.").
152 See, e.g., Haspel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,241 F. App'x 837, 839 n.3 (3d Cir.
2007) (insurance benefits suit); United States v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., No. 03-8239,
2007 WL 2091185,at *5 (N.D. Ill.July 20,2007) ( "piercing the corporate veil" context).
153 This circumstance can be referred to as information asymmetry. See, e.g. , Posting of
Randy Picker to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, http:/ /uchicagolaw.
typepad.com/faculty/2006/11/reading_twombly.html (Nov. 28, 2006, 09:46 AM) (defin
ing "information asymmetry" as "what I know that you don't know"). Professor Dodson has
also identified this as a problem with Twombly. See Dodson, supra note 2, at 124-25.
154 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58.
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Such a fluid, form-shifting standard is troubling for two reasons.
First, it is likely to impose a more onerous burden in those cases
where a liberal notice pleading standard is needed most: actions as
serting claims based on states of mind, secret agreements, and the
like, creating a class of disfavored actions in which plaintiffs will face
more hurdles to obtaining a resolution of their claims on the mer
its. 155 Second, a contextually-influenced rule violates the principle of
transubstantivity alluded to above, and does so through judicial inter
pretation rather than via separate rules as was done for cases involving
allegations of fraud or mistake. 1 56 Unfortunately, eroding the trans
substantivity norm by announcing a rule whose requirements vary
depending upon substantive context (and also upon cost/efficiency
concerns) , the Court has likely signaled to lower courts that it is per
missible to interpret and apply any of the Federal Rules in such a
manner.
III.

CRITIQUE

Although I have offered criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court's
2007 decision in Bell A tlantic Corp. v. Twombly157 as its contours were
presented above, this Part turns to a more focused critique that di
vides into two general areas. First, the Twombly opinion can be faulted
for propounding an untenable interpretation of Rule 8 (a) that is
wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and at odds with
other rules of pleading and procedure applicable in the federal
courts. The second line of attack questions the Court's abandonment
of a notice pleading standard based on policies related to efficiency
and judicial administration. In doing so the Court has seemingly
turned its back on the liberal ethos of the rules and moved towards a
more restrictive ethos. Such a state of affairs is unfortunate, particu
larly in light of the fact that the application of plausibility pleading is
likely to stymie many valid claims in addition to the groundless claims
that will not survive.

155 See Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REv. 551 , 553-54 (200 1 )
( "Whole categories of cases have been singled out for special procedural treatment,
thereby limiting the substantive rights of certain plaintiffs. Erecting these procedural hur
dles creates classes of disfavored cases and denies plaintiffs determination on the merits-
a substantive effect masked as procedural.") .
156 See Fairman,supra note 1 55, at 621 .
151 1 27 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) .
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A. Interpretive Critique

The Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 8 (a) (2) in Twombly
rankles because it is inconsistent with the liberal pleading regime estab
lished by the Federal Rules and previously embraced by the Court itself.
No one can question that the Federal Rules promulgated in 1938 estab
lished a liberal notice pleading regime under which conclusory legal
allegations were permissible. The Supreme Court blessed this under
standing of the rules with its canonical statements in 1957, in Con/,ey v.
Gibson, and its subsequent steadfast intolerance of lower court attempts
to erode the standard. 158 Below, this Section reviews the details of how
the Twombly Court inappropriately rejected its own pleading precedents
and offered an interpretation of Rule 8 that simply does not fit with the
liberal provisions of the Federal Rules as a whole.
1 . Supreme Court Precedent and Stare Decisis
One of the greatest difficulties with the Twombly Court's novel
interpretation of Rule 8 (a) (2) is that it is wholly inconsistent with Su
preme Court precedent. Ordinary principles of stare decisis were not
followed in Twombly, permitting the overruling of a long-standing
precedent in the absence of the "special justification" 159 that is usually
required for such a move. The doctrine of stare decisis obligates the
Court to adhere to precedent unless there is some "compelling justifi
cation, " 1 60 such as a determination that "governing decisions are un
workable or are badly reasoned. "1 61 Although the Court has indicated
that considerations of stare decisis are lessened in cases involving pro
cedural rules, 1 62 that admonition seems more descriptive of judge-made
158 See 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), alnvgated '7y Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. 1955; see also Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli
gence & Coordination Unit,507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
159 Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ("[A]ny departure from the doctrine
of stare decisis demands special justification.").
160 Hilton v. S.C. Public Rys. Comin'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991); see also Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 429 (2000) (" [ SJ tare decisis carries such persuasive force that
the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special
justification.").
161 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
162 Id. at 828 ("Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involv
ing property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true
in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules." (citations
omitted)); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) ("The role of stare de
cisis, furthermore, is 'somewhat reduced . . . in the case of a procedural rule . . . which
does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior.'" (citation omitted)).
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procedural rules, not those reflected in statutes or formally promul
gated rules. 163 Indeed, the Court has stated that " [c] onsiderations of
stare decisis are particularly forceful in the area of statutory construc
tion, especially when a unanimous interpretation of a statute has been
accepted as settled law for several decades. "164 The Court explained
the force of stare decisis in this context when it wrote:
Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is impli
cated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done . . .. Stare decisis has added force when the legislature,
in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have
acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance
overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and
expectations or require an extensive legislative response.1 65
Although here we are dealing with an interpretation of a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure-the content of which is more directly controlled
by the Court itself 1 66-the reasons articulated above for adhering to
long-standing and unquestioned interpretations of those rules absent
some "compelling justification" seem to apply with like force. Thus,
163 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 1 27 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2007) ("Given that Saucier [ v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)] is a judge-made procedural rule, stare decisis concerns support
ing preservation of the rule are weak.").
164 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has
stated that stare decisis has less force with respect to interpretations of the Sherman Act:
[ SJ tare decisis is not an inexorable command. In the area of antitrust law, there
is a competing interest, well represented in this Court's decisions, in recogniz
ing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated
experience. Thus, the general presumption that legislative changes should be
left to Congress has Jess force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the
accepted view that Congress expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omit
ted). This principle is inapplicable to Twombly because the interpretation at issue is an
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2), not an interpretation of a provision of the Sherman Act.
165 Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neal
v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1 996) ("Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives
in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress.
One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is
that Cong1·ess is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
166 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (2000) (providing for the rulemaking authority of the
Supreme Court).
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the questions for our consideration here are first, whether the Court
in Twombly did in fact depart from its own long-standing interpreta
tion of Rule 8 (a) (2) and second, if so, whether the Court's justifica
tion for doing so was sufficient in light of its prior statements on the
obligations of stare decisis.
Can it be fairly said that in Twombly the Court overruled its prior
precedent regarding Rule 8 (a) (2)? A critical step in the Twombly
Court's reconfiguration of the ordinary pleading standard in federal
civil cases was its abrogation of its admonition in Conley that a com
plaint could not be dismissed unless it was "beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. "167 Without discarding this aspect of the stan
dard, the Court's effort to impose a requirement of suggestive rather
than equivocal facts would have been unsuccessful. Indeed, it is this
very statement from Conley that permitted complaints containing only
factual allegations consistent with, rather than suggestive of, a claim of
liability to go forward in the past. Thus, the "no set of facts" language
had to go. But what is interesting about Twombly is that the Court did
not just come out and say that it was rejecting the Conley statement so
that it could change the standard for pleading under Rule 8. Rather,
the Court attempted to isolate and discredit only the "no set of facts"
language while simultaneously purporting to retain the notice pleading system largely intact. 168
Specifically, the Twombly Court attempted to discredit the "no set of
facts" statement by characterizing it as an embattled aspect of the Conley
opinion that had been "questioned, criticized, and explained away" by
"a good many judges and commentators." 169 Although the Court is c�r
tainly free to accept the criticism of courts and commentators and alter
its doctrine accordingly, it should admit that this criticism is convincing
and thus it is changi,ng its v iew of the law. Instead of doing so, the Twombly
Court used the criticism as a basis for suggesting that the statement was
not worth taking seriously and one that had not been taken seriously
for fifty years. Of course, the Court only could cite to lower court
precedent to build this aura of critique, 1 70 given that its own statements
Conl£y, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (stating that Conley's "no set of facts" language has
earned its retirement). But see id. at 1964 (citing Conley for proposition that a complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations).
169 /d. at 1969.
170 Id. (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989);
McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1988); Car Carriers,
167

1 68
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on the matter had been nothing but confirmatory since the time the
Conley Court first made the statement . 1 7 1
In fact, until Twombly, the Court had consistently and repeatedly
reaffirmed and applied Conley 's "no set of facts" admonition, 1 72 includInc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d
543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)). The Court neglected to cite to circuit precedent weighing in
favor of the Conley approach. See, e.g., Vincent v. City Coils. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th
Cir. 2007) ("Factual detail comes later-perhaps in response to a motion for a more defi
nite statement [or] in response to a motion for summary judgment. Until then, the possi
bility that facts to be adduced later, and consistent with the complaint, could prove the
claim, is enough for the litigation to move forward." ( citations omitted)); Wetmore v. Mac
Donald, Page, Schatz, Fletcher & Co., 476 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007) (relying upon "the
seminal teaching" of Conley's "no set of facts" standard); Stewart v. Nat'I Educ. Ass'n, 471
F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ( "Of course, a complaint should not be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. "); In re Tower Air,
Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief, we must
reverse the District Court." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Chosun Int'),
Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2005) ( " [A]t the Rule 12(b) (6)
stage . . . a complaint will not be dismissed unless it is beyond peradventure that the plain
tiff could prove no set of facts leading to success.").
171 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993); Hosp. Bldg.
Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976).
172 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U .S. at 514 ( "Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for
pleading, ' [a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. '" ( quot
ing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 ( 1984))); Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Mon
roe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) ("On this complaint, we cannot say
'beyond doubt that [petitioner] can prove no set of facts in support of [her) claim which
would entitle [her) to relief. "' (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46)); Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (" [I]f as a matter of law 'it is clear that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,' a claim must be
dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close
but ultimately unavailing one." (citation omitted)), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 804(a), (c) to (e), 110 Stat. 1321-73 to -75 (1996); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 598 (1989) ("In applying these principles to the dismissal of petitioners' Fourth
Amendment complaint for failure to state a claim, we can sustain the District Court's ac
tion only if, taking the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to petition
ers, we nonetheless conclude that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to relief
for a 'seizure.'" (citation omitted)); Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73 (applying Conley standard to
plaintiffs claim under Title VII); Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 297-98 (1983) (applying
Conley standard to plaintiffs negligence claim); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974) (citing Conley standard), aurogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (citing Conley standard with regard to plaintiffs § 1983
claim); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U .S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (applying Conley standard to pro se
prisoner's complaint under § 1983); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422 ( 1969) (ap
plying Conley standard to plaintiffs complaint alleging constitutional violations); cf. Sparks
v. England, 113 F.2d 579, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1940) ("The Rules of Civil Procedure · do not
require that a plaintiff shall plead every fact essential to his right to recover the amount of
which he claims. . . . If it is conceivable that, under the allegations of his complaint, a
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ing in the antitrust context. 1 73 Looking at a couple of these instances
is instructive. In 1993, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court on the pleading issue, affirmed
the sufficiency of pleadings that alleged a boycott by defendant rein
surers in the context of an antitrust suit. 1 74 He wrote as follows:
Many other allegations in the complaints describe conduct
that may amount to a boycott "if the plaintiffs can prove cer
tain additional facts. . . . [Certain domestic reinsurers] are al
leged to have "agreed to boycott the 1984 ISO forms unless a
retroactive date was added to the claims-made form, and a
pollution exclusion and a defense cost cap were added to
both [the occurrence and claims made] forms." Liberally
construed, this allegation may mean that the defendants had
linked their demands so that they would continue to refuse
to do business on either form until both were changed to their
liking. Again, that might amount to a boycott. Under [the
Conley] standard, these allegations are sufficient . . . . 1 75
These allegations, according to Justice Scalia, only "may amount to a
boycott," and whether they will be deemed to amount to a boycott
depends on "if the plaintiffs can prove certain additional facts."1 76 The
Hartford Fire Court did not require that these "certain additional facts"
be pleaded. 1 77 Rather, because the allegations that were pleaded
"might" amount to a boycott under the right factual circumstances,
Justice Scalia read and applied Conley to require that the Court give
the plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain those facts and prove their
claims during a later stage of the litigation process . 1 78
The Court has previously explained that the need to adhere to
liberal notice pleading and to Conley's "no set of facts" standard is
more urgent in the antitrust context, not less. 1 79 This is because alleplaintiff can, upon trial, establish a case which would entitle him to the relief prayed for, a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of statement ough_t not to be granted.").
m Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 811 (quoting and applying Conley's "no set of facts" lan
guage in an antitrust case); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232,
246 (1980) (stating that the Conley standard "applies with no less force to a Sherman Act
claim"); Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 746 (quoting and applying Conley's "no set of facts"
language in an antitrust case).
114 509 U.S. at 800.
17s Id. at 811 (citations omitted).
1 76 Id. (emphasis added).
177 See id.
1 1s Id.
1 79 See Hosp. Bl.dg. Co., 425 U.S. at 746.
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gations regarding a conspiracy will typically involve facts that plaintiffs
cannot access before being afforded the opportunity for discovery. 180
As the Supreme Court stated in 1976, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trus
tees of Rex Hospital, regarding the Conley standard, "in antitrust cases,
where 'the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,'
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
should be granted very sparingly. " 181 Twombly's rejection of a com
plaint that alleged facts that were indeed consistent with an unlawful
conspiracy was thus out of step with the Court's previous position that
such plaintiffs require discovery to develop support for their claims.
In light of the Court's previously unwavering embrace and appli
cation of Conley's "no set of facts" standard-both generally and with
special force in antitrust cases-it cannot be gainsaid that, in an
nouncing its new standard of plausibility, the Court has overhauled
pleading doctrine in a way that represents a departure from its previ
ously articulated views. 182 Although there is plenty of room to argue
that the Court truly did not see itself as departing from the core no
tice pleading standard that has governed civil complaints under the
Federal Rules, it seems that such an about-face respecting Conley, cou
pled with the Court's repeated and unprecedented emphasis that
facts showing plausible entitlement to relief must be pleaded, pro
vides more support for the view that Twombly indeed represents at
least a de facto departure from notice pleading as that concept has
heretofore been understood.
Was such a significan,t departure from long-standing precedent
warranted under the Court's own standards governing stare decisis?
The answer is clearly no. Ordinarily, the Court reverses prior holdings
when they have been shown to be erroneous, 183 inconsistently ap
plied, 184 or unworkable. 185 In a previous case, Justice Scalia noted that
180
181

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).

182 Other commentators agree that Twombly represents a dramatic alteration of civil
pleading standards. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 147,at 13 ("The U.S. Supreme Court on
May 21 issued a decision that marks . . . a surprising deparnire from ingrained federal
pleading rules.").
183 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (" [W] e think stare decisis cannot
possibly be controlling when . . . the decision in question has been proved manifestly er
roneous,and its underpinnings eroded,by subsequent decisions of this Court.").
184 Hohn, 524 U.S. at 253 (indicating that "the consistency with which [a rule] has been
applied in practice" impacts the Court's determination of whether to overrule a previous
holding).
185 Payne,501 U.S. at 827.
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these special justifications still applied in procedural cases when he
wrote,
[E]ven those cases cited by the Court as applying the "some
what reduced" standard to procedural holdings still felt the
need to set forth special factors justifying the overruling.
· United States v. Gaudin concluded that "the decision in ques
tion had been proved manifestly erroneous, and its under
pinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court"; and
Payne v. Tennessee noted that the overruled cases had been
"decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging [their] basic underpinnings," had been "ques
tioned by Members of the Court in later decisions," and had
"defied consistent application by the lower courts. "186
The Twombly Court did not suggest that Conley's "no set of facts" lan
guage reflected an erroneous understanding of Rule 8. 1 87 Nor had
there been any history of inconsistent application of the Conley stan
dard in prior opinions of the Supreme Court, although the Twombly
Court found relevant the purportedly mixed treatment of the state
ment by lower federal courts. 188
Perhaps then the overruling of Conley was warranted because it
was unworkable. After all, the Court relied heavily on the fact that dis
covery in antitrust cases was now quite an expensive proposition and
that it was necessary to require more from complaints to prevent
plaintiffs from being able to extort defendants into a settlement. 189
But such policy concerns, even if the product of changed circum
stances such as the rising cost of modern discovery in complex cases,
do not represent the kind of unworkability the Court has in mind as
being sufficient to warrant the overruling of long-standing prece
dent. 1 90 Rather, a previous decision becomes "unworkable" when it is
no longer compatible or consistent with the larger legal landscape or
irreconcilable with important substantive legal policies. The Supreme
Court's language in 1996, in Neal v. United States, stated the point well:
We have overruled our precedents when the intervening de
velopment of the law has "removed or weakened the concepHohn, 524 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, ]., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See generally Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
188 See id. at 1959.
189 /d. at 1959, 1966.
190 See Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; see also Hohn, 524 U.S. at 253; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521 .
186

187
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tual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the
later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with com
peting legal doctrines or policies." Absent those changes or
compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original intent,
our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpreta
tions of statutes. 1 91
The Court offered nothing so compelling to justify the overrul
ing of Conley. Rather, the Twombly Court simply reconsidered the wis
dom of the Conley standard given its imposition of a bar so low that it
would prove easy for plaintiffs with questionable claims to invoke the
power of the court to impose high discovery costs on corporate de
fendants. Because the Court found this ability to coerce settlements
based on these threatened expenses to be repugnant, the Court dis
carded the Conley standard and substituted a stricter one that would
raise the bar for gaining access to valuable discovery. 1 92 Regardless of
whether it makes good policy sense to alter the pleading rules to
guard against the possibility of extortionary settlements and the lodg
ing of groundless claims, such a motivation is not a proper basis for
overruling an interpretation of a promulgated Federal Rule that had
been accepted by Congress and remained unchallenged by Congress
or the Court for fifty years.
Perhaps by ridiculing the statement in Conley as some crazy old
relative that had long been viewed derisively by most members of the
family, the Court was able to conceal the magnitude of what it was do
ing in abrogating Conley and to get away with not making any effort to
articulate the compelling justification ordinarily required for depar
tures from stare decisis. Alternatively, the Court could have convinced
itself that it was not doing anything dramatic that warranted justifica
tion. Indeed, it attempted to distinguish what it did in Twombly from
heightened pleading 1 93 and held on to the rhetoric of notice pleading
both in Twombly 194 and in Erickson v. Pardus. 195 But as has been demonNeal, 516 U.S. at 295 (citations omitted).
See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
193 Id. at 1974 ("Here . . . we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."). The Second Cir
cuit seemed to accept this distinction when it wrote, " [W] e believe the Court is not requir
ing a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible
'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allega
tions in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible. "
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007).
194 127 S. Ct. at 1964 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to
191

192
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strated above, the Court cannot disguise the fact that it has abruptly
and radically revised pleading doctrine by burying the most critical
component of notice pleading: the obligation of courts to allow com
plaints to proceed unless they could be confident that the plaintiff
could not prove any set of facts that would establish its case. Thus, the
Court owes both an acknowledgement of the dramatic nature of the
change in doctrine that it has made and a better justification for over
ruling Conley than it offered in Twombly.
2. Plausibility Pleading and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Apart from representing an insufficiently justified departure from
the principles of stare decisis, the Twombly interpretation of Rule
S (a) (2) is out of step with the larger matrix of rules governing proce
dure in federal civil cases. Reading Rule S (a) (2) to obligate plaintiffs to
plead facts that paint a plausible picture of liability does not at all sit
tomfortably with an array of rules that govern pleading and procedure
in the federal courts. Specifically, the Court's strict reading of Rule
S (a) (2) is at odds with former Rule S(f) 's admonition to interpret
pleadings liberally, Rule 9(b) 's reservation of particularized pleading
for certain circumstances, Rule 11 (b) 's allowance of pleadings that de
pend on future discovery for their validation, and Rule 12 (e)'s provi
sion for a device that offers a remedy for insufficiently detailed plead
ing short of dismissal.196 These criticisms of the Court's opinion will be
explored below.
a . Rule 8(a) (2) and Generalized Pleading Under the Federal Rules

As the Court has previously emphasized, "Other provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule S (a) 's
simplified notice pleading standard. "197 In other words, Rule 8 (a) (2)
cannot be read in isolation but must be seen as a component of a
group of rules whose purpose was to establish a liberal pleading system
in which the burdens placed on those asserting claims were minimal.
'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."' (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47) ) .
195 127 S . Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) ("[T)he statement need only 'give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' (quoting Twombly,
127 S. Ct. at 1964) ) .
196 See FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b) , l l (b) , 12 (e); FED. R. C1v. P. 8 (t) , 28 U.S.C. app. (2000)
(amended 2007).
197 Surierkiewicz,534 U.S. at 513.
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Beyond the language of Rule '8 (a) (2) itself, which requires only a
"short and plain statement of the claim, " 198 Rule 8 requires pleadings to
be construed so as to do justice. 199 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision to mean that "the complaint is to be liberally construed
in favor of plainti ff. "200 Indeed it was with reference to former Rule 8 (f)
that the Con/,ey Court intoned, ''The Federal Rules rej_ect the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."201 Thus, the
purpose of former Rule 8 (f)-now numbered as Rule 8 (e)-is to in
sure that judges make every effort to read a complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, liberally construing it to state a claim unless it
is clear that the plaintiff will be unable to make out a claim. 202 Con!,ey's
"no set of facts" statement, then, must be understood to be a direct
outgrowth of this obligation on the part of courts. If the Twombly
Court's reading of Rule 8 (a) (2) required the rejection of Con/,ey's "no
set of facts" language, then plausibility pleading either implicitly repu
diates or is simply incompatible with the liberal construction duty of
former Rule 8(f) on which Con/,ey's statement was based.
Rule 1 1 offers the next accommodation of the rules in favor of
generalized pleadings. Under Rule 1 1 , attorneys certify that the
claims presented in a complaint are warranted by the law and that the
allegations "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
are likely to hav e ev identiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
inv estigation or discov ery. "203 This allowance is directly connected to the
liberal pleading standard that is supposed to apply in the federal sys
tem. The Supreme Court seemed to make this connection in an ear
lier case when, in response to a plaintiff's concern that Rule 9 (b) 's
heightened pleading standard would frustrate fraud-based RICO
claims, the Court wrote, "Rotella [the plaintiff below] has presented
no case in which Rule 9 (b) has effectively barred a claim like his, and
FED. R. C1v. P. 8 (a) (2).
R. C1v. P. 8 (e) ( "Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). Interest
ingly, the December 1 , 2007 amendments to Rule 8 omitted the word "substantial." See
FED. R. C1v. P. 8(£) , 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) (amended 2007) ( "All pleadings shall be so con
strued as to do substantial justice.").
200 Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 421 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 8(£) , 28 U.S.C. app. ( 2000) (amended
2007); Co n ley, 355 U.S. 41).
201 Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
202 See Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 421 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 8(£) , 28 U.S.C. app. (2000)
(amended 2007); Co nley, 355 U.S. 41).
203 FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (b) (3) (emphasis added).
19s

199 FED.
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he ignores the flexibility provided by Rule 11 (b) (3), allowing plead
ings based on evidence reasonably anticipated after further investiga
tion or discovery."204 Lower federal courts have linked the flexibility of
Rule 1 1 (b) (3) with the liberal notice pleading standard as well.205
By moving from notice pleading to plausibility pleading requiring
factual allegations, the Court seems to be precluding the very types of
complaints contemplated and permitted by Rule l l (b) . That is, al
though Rule 11 (b) allows for the possibility that the pleader will re
quire discovery to obtain supportive facts, plausibility pleading does not
make such an allowance. Rather, plaintiffs are required to offer such
facts at the pleading phase before discovery may occur. 206 Of course,
requiring plaintiffs to offer factual allegations that plausibly suggest li
ability is a particular burden when key facts are likely obtainable only
through discovery, such as when conspiracies are being alleged.
The provision for a motion for a more definite statement found in
Rule 12 (e) further affirms the intended liberality of the pleading rules
by making repleading rather than dismissal the appropriate remedy for
a complaint lacking sufficient detail.207 The Supreme Court made this
clear in 1959, in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, when it wrote,
"It may well be that petitioner's complaint as now drawn is too vague,
but that is no ground for dismissing his action. His allegations are suffi
cient for the present. Whether petitioner can in fact make out a case
calling for application of the doctrine of estoppel must await trial. "208
The necessary implication of Rule 12 (e) is that a complaint that lacks
enough factual detail does not fail to state a claim but rather states a
claim without offering the defendant enough information to prepare a
response.209 Rule 12 (e) then reaffirms the base standard of generalized
pleading by testifying to the fact that complaints lacking factual detail
are not condemnable as inadequate and worthy of dismissal. It is for
subsequent stages of the litigation to require the plaintiff to adduce

201 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,560 (2000).
205 See, e.g., Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Rule 11 neither modifies the 'notice pleading' approach of the federal rules nor re
quires counsel to prove the case in advance of discovery.").
206 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
207 See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(e).
20s 359 U.S. 231,235 (1959) (citation omitted).
209 Swierhiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a man
ner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e) before responding.").
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supporting facts and prove its case. 210 By requiring the pleading of facts
that support the conclusory legal assertions in a complaint in a way that
plausibly shows liability, Twombly's plausibility pleading standard inter
prets Rule 8(a) (2) in a way that requires the very detail that Rule I 2 (e)
suggests that a complaint may lack.
The Official Forms appended to the Federal Rules buttress the
point and further contribute to the liberal generalized pleading system
established by the rules. The Official Forms are riddled with complaints
containing legal conclusions such as "owes,"211 "negligently,"212 "will
fully,"21 3 "recklessly,"214 and "converted"215 that are not unpacked into
their constituent facts. 216 For example, what makes the defendant's
driving reckless in Form 12? Excessive speed? Driving on the wrong
side of the road? Driving at night without headlights illuminated?
These pure legal conclusions-which are kin to the conclusory terms of
antitrust claims such as "agreement" and "conspiracy" or those of civil
rights claims such as "discriminatory" -are terms whose use the Offi
cial Forms clearly endorse. Certainly, to prove its claim it is expected
that the plaintiff will subsequently have to offer factual support for
these conclusory allegations. But the rules were not written to require
the proffering of such support at the pleading stage. Rather, as Rules
8(f) , l l (b) (3) , 1 2(e) , and the Official Forms show, the requirement of
a "short and plain statement of the claim"217 is a minimal duty, fully dis210 See id. at 5 1 2 ("This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery
rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims.").
2 1 1 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 10.
212 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11, 12.
2 13 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 12.

214 Id.

21 s FED. R. CIV. P. Form 15.
216 J ames William Moore, protege

of Charles Clark and an eminent authority on the
Federal Rules, spoke of these conclusory legal terms in his original treatise on the rules:
The phrases "executed and delivered", "owes", "sold and delivered", "owes
plaintiff $10,000 for money lent", "owes plaintiff $10,000 for money paid by
plaintiff to defendant by mistake", "owes plaintiff $10,000 for money had and
received", "negligently drove", "willfully or recklessly or negligently drove",
"converted" clearly do not fall within a scientific definition of "fact". They are
mixed conclusions concerning propositions of fact and law, but they are suc
cinct and have a definite meaning to the lawyer. Courts generally have re
garded them as sufficient and all of them are to be found in the Official
Forms which accompany the Federal Rules.
1 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH F RIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDE RAL P RACTICE § 8.07 (1st ed.
1938).
211 FED. R. CIV. P . 8(a) (2).
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chargeable via the use of conclusory legal terms and skeletal contextual
facts sufficient to provide notice.
b. Reading Rule 8(a) (2) Through Ru/,e 9(b)
The minimal pleading burden imposed by Rule 8 (a) (2) is further
underscored by its juxtaposition against the heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9 (b) . Two aspects of Rule 9 ( b) give us confidence
that Rule 8 (a) (2) requires generalized notice pleading, not the plau
sibility pleading of the Twombly Court. First, Rule 9(b) 's first sentence
requires particularized pleading in all averments of fraud or mis
take. 2 1 8 As the Court has emphasized in the past, this singling-out of
specific circumstances warranting heightened particularized pleading
indicates that the rules meant to exclude all other cases from height
ened pleading. 219 Second, Rule 9 (b) 's second sentence then tells the
reader that the alternative to the particularized pleading required for
averments of fraud and mistake is pleading generally. 220 The sentence
reads, "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally. "221 Averring matters "generally" which is a reference to the pleading standard of Rule 8 (a) (2) -is ex
actly the style of pleading exemplified by the conclusory allegations
found among the Official Forms and implicitly sanctioned by Rule
12 (e) 's refusal to impose dismissal on those complaints lacking suffi
cient detail. 222 Rule 9(b) , therefore, sets out two clear tests for the va
lidity of an interpretation of Rule 8 (a) (2) : first, Rule 8 (a) (2) may not
be interpreted to impose a heightened pleading requirement beyond
the fraud or mistake context because such cases are not mentioned in
Rule 9(b) ; and second, Rule 8 (a) (2) may not be interpreted to re
quire anything other than the pleading of matters "generally."223
The Twombly Court's declaration that Rule 8 (a) (2) requires the
pleading of factual allegations that paint a plausible picture of liability
fails on both accounts. First, it is clear that Twombly's plausibility plead
ing standard rejects the generalized pleading alluded to in the second
21 s FED . R. Clv. P. 9(b).
219 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 ("[T ) he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the
question of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not in
clude among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal li
ability under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio alierius. ").
220 FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b).
221 Id.
222 See FED. R. C1v. P.-12(e); FED. R. C1v. P. Form 10-13, 15.
223 See FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b) .
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sentence of Rule 9 (b) . Any standard that requires "more than labels
and conclusions" and explicitly calls for the pleading of suggestive facts
supporting legal assertions such as the existence of an unlawful agree
ment or conspiracy fails to permit matters to be averred generally. 224
Second, it is hard to distinguish the Court's plausibility standard
from the heightened pleading obligation of Rule 9 (b) . In the fraud
context, courts have interpreted this rule to require the pleading of
specific facts identifying misleading statements or omissions, the iden
tity of the person making the statement, the time and place of the
statement, and how the content of the statement misled the plain
tiff. 225 Form 1 3 in the Appendix to the pre-December 1, 2007 version
of the Federal Rules provides a whiff of what the rule drafters had in
mind when crafting Rule 9(b) 's particularity requirement. 226 In alleg
ing a fraudulent convey ance, former Form 1 3 asserts,
Defendant C. D. on or about __ convey ed all his property,
real and personal [or specify and describe] to defendant E. F.
for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff and hindering and de
laying the collection of the indebtedness evidenced by the
note above referred to. 227
Here there is an allegation that identifies who committed the fraud, the
conduct that constituted the fraud, and how that fraud injured the
plaintiff. The allegation, however, remains fairly conclusory and factless
in character. It contains a bald assertion that the conveyance was for
fraudulent purposes without offering any factual allegations in support
of this assertion. Nevertheless, the rulemakers felt that the information
offered sufficed even under the heightened particularity requirement
of Rule 9 (b) because it achieves notice-the defendant has a clear idea
of the circumstances to which the plaintiff refers in alleging fraud and
can prepare a defense characterizing the cited transaction as legitimate.
Most lower courts have thus recognized that Rule 9(b) 's particularity
requirement remains tempered by the general ethos of simplicity in the
pleadings reflected in the Federal Rules. 228
See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int'!, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001); Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000).
226 See FED. R. C1v. P. Form 13, 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) (amended 2007). The current
version of this form is substantially similar. See FED. R. C1v. P. Form 21.
227 FED. R. C1v. P. Form 13, 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) (amended 2007).
228 See, e.g., Saltire Indus., Inc. v. Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, PLLC, 491 F.3d
522,
526 (6th Cir. 2007) ("When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b) . . . a court must
also consider the policy favoring simplicity in pleading, codified in the short and plain
224
225
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Twombly's plausibility pleading standard imposes on litigants a
pleading obligation that approaches the particularity requirement of
Rule 9(b) . In describing a litigant's ordinary pleading burden under
Rule 8 (a) , the Twombly Court wrote that stating a claim "requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do. ''229 Further, the complaint must include
factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the specula
tive level. "230 In antitrust cases, that meant that the plaintiff had to offer
a complaint with "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that
an agreement was made. "231 Clearly, requiring the pleading of enough
facts that move a complaint from being conclusory and speculative to
suggestive and plausible is tantamount to a particularity requirement.
The Court's attempt to disclaim the notion that it was in fact ap
plying heightened pleading akin to that permitted under Rule 9(b)
was unconvincing:
In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any "heightened"
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accom
plished '"by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation. "' On certain subjects under
stood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must
state factual allegations 'Vith greater particularity than Rule 8
requires. Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the
complaint were insufficiently "particular[ized] "; rather, the
complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to ren
der plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible. 232
The statement simply does not bear scrutiny. Why did the Court con
clude that the plaintiffs' entitlement to relief was not plausible? Accord
ing to the Court, "Although in form a few stray statements speak di
rectly of agreement, " "nothing in the complaint intimates that the
resistance to the upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral
reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance. "233 In
statement of the claim requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 9 (b) 's par
ticularity requirement does not mute the general principles set out in Rule 8; rather, the
two rules must be read in harmony. " (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ) .
229 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
230 Id.
231 Id.
m Id. at 1 973 n . 1 4 (citations omitted) .
m Id. at 1970, 1971.
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other words, even though the complaint alleged that an unlawful con
spiracy was behind the challenged harmful conduct, the complaint
lacked specific factual allegations that supported the allegation of con
spiracy and discounted alternate explanations of the behavior. Requir
ing specific facts that back up a conclusory allegation of wrongdoing is
the very definition of particularized pleading. Thus, it is unclear how
the Court can view its holding in Twombly as imposing any thing but a
particularity requirement of the kind found in Rule 9(b) .
That the new plausibility pleading of Rule 8(a) approaches the
particularized pleading of Rule 9(b) becomes even more clear when
one views the pleading standard rejected by the Supreme Court in
200 1 , in Swierkiewicz v. Sorerna N.A. 234 In that case, the Court faced a
lower court standard that required plaintiffs to plead enough facts that
supported an inference of discrimination when asserting claims under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 235 In the face of a complaint alleging that
the plaintiff had been unlawfully terminated on account of his age and
national origin, the district court concluded, and the Second Circuit
panel agreed, that the plaintiff "ha[d] not adequately alleged circum
stances that support an inference of discrimination" because he was not
offering direct evidence of discrimination. 236 The Supreme Court had
no trouble referring to the Second Circuit's requirement as a "height
ened pleading standard" of the kind restricted to certain enumerated
circumstances under Rule 9(b) . 237 According to the Court, then, the
Second Circuit rule, which called for more particulars supporting the
allegation of discrimination, was inappropriate because Rule 9 (b)
makes no mention of employment discrimination claims. 238 Further,
the Court wrote, "[a] requirement of greater specificity for particular
claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. "'239
The plausibility pleading standard announced by the Court in
Twombly is no different from the Second Circuit's heightened pleading
standard that the Court rejected in Swierkiewicz. 240 Both standards re
quire that specific facts supporting the inference of wrongdoing (dis234 534 U.S. at 509.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 512-13.
238 Id. at 513.
239 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 5 15.
240 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1982 (Stevens, ].,dissenting) ("Most recently, in Swierkiewicz,

we were faced with a case more similar to the present one than the majority will allow." (cita
tion omitted)).
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crimination or an unlawful conspiracy) be alleged in the complaint.241
Both standards were motivated by a desire to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs with groundless claims to move forward with burdensome liti
gation. And both cases involved plaintiffs who made conclusory allega
tions of wrongdoing (discrimination and an unlawful conspiracy) but
tressed by factual allegations offering only indirect, inferential support
for the central claims.242 But if Rule 9(b) suggested the impropriety of a
judicially crafted heightened pleading standard in the context of the
Second Circuit's rule in Swierkiewicz, then the same analysis applies to
the Court's · judicially-crafted heightened pleading standard that
emerges from Twombly. For the Court to promulgate the very class of
pleading standard that it only recently rejected in Swierkiewicz simply
underscores that the Court has clearly changed its views regarding the
imperative of revising pleading standards to stave off frivolous claims
and discovery abuse. In sum, plausibility pleading is heightened par
ticularized pleading plain and simple.
3. Habeas Corpus Rule 2 (c)
Before proceeding to the policy critique, it is worth noting another
basis for doubting the accuracy of the Court's reading of Rule 8 (a) (2) .
When one looks at Rule 2 (c) of the Rules Governing Proceedings un
der § 2254243 (the "Habeas Rules") and commentary surrounding that
rule, it is clear that Rule 8 (a) (2) should not be read to require plausi
bility pleading or even fact pleading. In 2005, in Mayle v. Felix, the Su
preme Court compared Rule 8 (a) with the heightened pleading re
quirement of Habeas Rule 2 (c):
Under Rule 8 (a) , applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a
complaint need only provide "fair notice of what the plain
tiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Habeas
Corpus Rule 2 (c) is more demanding. It provides that the pe
tition must "specify all the grounds for relief available to the
petitioner" and "state the facts supporting each ground."244
Clearly, if Habeas Rule 2 (c) is "more demanding" than Rule 8 (a) be
cause it requires a petition to "state the facts supporting each ground"
241 Id. at 1965 (majority opinion); Swierkiewicz., 534 U.S. at 509.
242 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970; Swierkiewicz., 534 U.S. at 508-09, 514.
243 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 2(c),
28 u.s.c.§ 2254 (2000).
244 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (citations omitted).
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for relief, then that suggests that it is improper to hold-as the
Twombly Court did-that under Rule 8(a) (2) a complaint must make
factual allegations that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. "245
Reference to the Advisory Committee's Notes on the Habeas Rules
makes the point even more clear. In explaining Habeas Rule 2(c) 's re
quirement that a petition state the facts supporting each ground, the
Committee wrote that, in the past, petitions frequently contained mere
conclusions of law, unsupported by facts. 246 The Committee explained
that "(s]ince it is the relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that
is important, these petitions were obviously deficient."247 The Commit
tee went on to explain in its Note to Rule 4, concerning a judge's pre
liminary review of the petition, that '"notice' pleading is not sufficient,
for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a 'real possibility
of constitutional error.' "248
What is interesting here is that the Advisory Committee explicitly
distinguished the Habeas Rules from Rule 8(a) 's "notice" pleading.249
Clearly, then, there must be some difference between Rule S(a) 's stan
dard and the standard of Habeas Rule 2-(c) . Further, the Committee
indicated that the facts that are pleaded in a habeas petition must point
to a "real possibility of constitutional error," revealing that the facts must
be highly suggestive of a meritorious petition, thus pushing the petition
over the line from speculation to plausibility. 250 How then can the
Twombly Court interpret Federal Civil Rule 8(a)'s pleading standard to
require factual allegations that make a claim plausible? Such a standard
is no different than that of Habeas Rule 2 (c) , even though the Advisory
Committee distinguished the two, suggesting that Twombly's reading of
Rule S(a) was inappropriate.

m Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. at 1 965.
246 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 2, 28
U.S.C.§ 2254 (2000) advisory committee's note to the 1976 adoption.
241 Id.
248 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4, 28
U.S.C.§ 2254 (2000) advisory committee's note to the 1 976 adoption (quoting Aubut v.
Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1 970)).
249 Id.
250 Id. (quoting Aubut, 431 F.2d at 689) (emphasis added).
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B. Policy Critique
1 . From a Liberal to Restrictive Ethos
The featured rationale for the Supreme Court's revision of federal
civil pleading standards under Rule 8 (a) (2) was its concern that the
former standard too easily allowed plaintiffs with groundless claims to
impose on defendants the "enormous expense of discovery."25 1 The
Court also alluded to "the increasing caseload of the federal courts"252
and a need to prevent "discovery abuse"253 in support of its tighter
standard. The Twombly standard is troubling because, in relying on such
concerns, the Court appears to have exalted goals of sound judicial
administration and efficiency above the original core concern of the
rules: progressive reform in favor of expanding litigant access to justice.
Thus I believe what we are witnessing is simply the latest and perhaps
final chapter in a long saga that has moved the federal civil system from
a liberal to a restrictive ethos.
The "liberal ethos" of the Federal Rules refers to the underlying
policy toward which the rules as a whole incline: the facilitation of
litigant access in the interest of reaching merits-based resolutions of
cases. 254 We have already reviewed in detail those aspects of the rules
that call for liberality in pleading.255 But the rules as a whole-at least
initially-reflected the liberal ethos:
The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer jus
tice through fair trials, not through summary dismissals as
necessary as they may be on occasion. These rules were de
signed in large part to get away from some of the old proce
dural booby traps which common-law pl�aders could set to
prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day
in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in an
honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but
251 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1 967.
252 /d. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc., 745 F.2d at 1 1 06).
253 /d.
254 Marcus, supra note 23, at 439 ( "Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark
and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that
would install what may be labeled the 'liberal ethos,' in which the preferred disposition is
on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.").
255 See supra notes 1 97-242 and accompanying text; see also Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) ( " [O)rdinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a
great burden upon a plaintiff." (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513-15)).
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should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide com
plaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits. 256
Because merits-based resolutions at trial were the overall goal of pro
cedure, then, the pleadings were not intended to offer courts an op
portunity to scrutinize the merits of the claim. Thus, as the Court has
stated, "Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to
whether a claim will succeed on the merits. "257
There is no question that over the past twenty-five years the lib
eral ethos of civil procedure has been challenged. Indeed, a series of
reforms made in the wake of the Pound Conference of 1976, 258 have
explicitly sought to curtail perceived litigation abuse through changes
to the rules that give courts greater authority to eliminate frivolous
issues259 and control the bringing of baseless claims. 260 Summar y
256 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966); see also Schiavone v. For
tune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986) (" [T]he principal function of procedural rules should be to
serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their
problems before the courts." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded
uy Frn. R. C1v. P. 15.
257 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515; see also Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 ( "The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evi
dence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a re
covery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."), abrogated uy Harlow, 457 U.S.
800.
258

See generally THE

POUND CoNFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE

(A.

Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1 979).
259 FED. R. C1v. P. 16 (c)(1) (permitting courts to take action with respect to "the for
mulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or
defenses"). In its notes to the 1983 amendment of Rule 16, the Advisory Committee wrote:
The reference in Rule 16(c) (1) to "formulation" is intended to clarify and
confirm the court's power to identify the litigable issues. It has been added in
the hope of promoting efficiency and conser ving judicial resources by identi
fying the real issues prior to trial, thereby saving time and expense for every
one. The notion is emphasized by expressly authorizing the elimination of
frivolous claims or defenses at a pretrial conference.
FED. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments (citations omitted).
260 Rule 11 was amended in 1983 in an effort to reduce the number of "frivolous"
claims brought into the system. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983
amendments. The Advisory Committee wrote:
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring
abuses. . . . The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the
rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. This
standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is
expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation.
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judgment has been reaffirmed (some would argue strengthened ) as a
screening device261 and discover y has been tightened in its scope. 262
But heretofore, this move away from the liberal ethos had not reached
the pleading stage, at least not from the Supreme Court's perspec
tive. 263 As noted in Part I, the Court had been steadfast in its commit
ment to liberal pleading from Conley through its unanimous opinion
in Swierkiewicz. 264
Twombly runs counter to the liberal ethos that had still character
ized the pleading stage because rather than "guarantee [ing] that bona
fide complaints [are] carried to an adjudication on the merits"265which is precisely what the Con/,ey standard facilitated-plausibility
pleading rejects potentially valid, meritorious claims. Under plausibility
pleading, one has no confidence that a plaintiffs dismissed claim was
frivolous or nonmeritorious because it permits the dismissal of com
plaints that assert wrongdoing, but merely offer supporting factual alle
gations consistent with-rather than factually suggestive of-liability.
Thus, although discover y might reveal facts that prove liability, that op
portunity is preemptively foreclosed and the investigation for suppor
tive facts that the rules contemplate266 never occurs.
Indeed, it is a greater shame that discover y is foreclosed for such
complainants in circumstances where the needed supporting facts lie
within the exclusive possession of the defendants, which can be the
case in antitrust cases lacking direct evidence of a conspiracy. As the
Court has noted on this score, "summary procedures should be used
Id. (citations omitted). Rule 11 was revised again in 1993 to pull the rule back in the liberal
direction, the sense being that the 1983 amendment had gone too far in restricting access
by chilling the filing of valid claims. See generally Carl Tobias, The 1 993 Revisio n of Federal
Rule 1 1, 70 IND. LJ. 1 i1 (1994) (discussing in depth the 1983 and 1993 amendments to
Rule 11).
261 See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4ii U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 4ii U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
262 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments ( "The
scope of the disclosure obligation is narrowed to cover only information that the disclosing
party may use to support its position.").
263 Recall that lower courts had long departed from the liberal ethos in pleading as
evidenced in their persistent imposition of heightened pleading standards over the past
roughly thirty years. See Fairman, su/1ra note 9,at 1011-59.
264 See supra notes 20-53 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 173 & 174 and accompanying text.
265 Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 373.
266 See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (b) (3) (stating that counsel may make allegations that "are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery").
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sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira
tors, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. ''267 A liberal pleading
standard is thus particularly appropriate in such instances because the
plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to uncover decisive support
ing information. 268 Professor Marcus well stated the point in response
to the heightened pleading ·standards being imposed by lower federal
courts when he wrote,
[W]here the plaintiff is unable to provide details because
only the defendant possesses such information, no such con
fidence is possible. To the contrary, it may be that the de
fendant has so effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the
plaintiff can unearth it only with discovery. To insist on de
tails as a prerequisite to discovery is putting the cart before
the horse. 269
Rather than dismissing a complaint offering factual allegations
that make a valid claim only a possibility, an action should progress un
til the point at which the court can determine that the claim is indeed
meritless. 270 Plausibility pleading permits dismissal before that judg
ment can be made and in fact permits dismissal without requiring such
a judgment to be made. By rejecting Conley's "no set of facts" formula
tion, courts no longer have to determine that no possible reading of
the plaintiffs allegations would support a claim. Rather, courts may re
spond to complaints as follows: ''The allegations are consistent with a
claim, but also could be consistent with no claim; because the allega
tions could go either way, and I've been given no additional facts that
preponderate in the direction of a claim, the complaint is dismissed."
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) .
See Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 746 ("[I]n antitrust cases, where the proof is largely
in the hands of the alleged conspirators, dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample op
portunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly." (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) ) .
269 M arcus, supra note 23, at 468 (citations omitted).
270 If the expense of discovery is a concern, courts can limit discovery to certain topics
focused on verifying that a factual basis for the claims exist. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1987
n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rule 26(c) specifically permits a court to take actions 'to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense' by, for example, disallowing a particular discovery request, setting appropriate
terms and conditions, or limiting its scope.") . Further, courts should be able to shift some
of the cost of such limited discovery to the plaintiffs under Rule 26(b) , action that would
give plaintiffs an additional incentive (beyond Rule 11) to plead valid, viable claims and to
limit their initial discovery efforts to minimize this expense. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b).
267

268
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After a Twombly dismissal, observers can only say, "He might have had a
claim but he failed to 'prove' it." One cannot say, "He did not have a
claim" or "His claim was groundless."
2. The Impropriety of Pleadings Decisions to Screen Out Groundless
Claims
In addition to running counter to the liberal ethos of procedure,
plausibility pleading assigns to complaints a function they cannot
truly fulfill. A foundational understanding on which the Federal Rules
were based was the belief that pleadings poorly fulfilled the range of
functions historically assigned to them under the predecessor regimes
of code pleading and common law pleading.2 7 1 Among the functions
that pleadings are most ineffective at fulfilling is providing courts the
ability to determine whether the plaintiffs claims are meritorious or
can be proved. Charles Clark made this point when he wrote, "Ex
perience has shown, therefore, that we cannot expect the proof of the
case to be made through the pleadings, and that such proof is really
not their function. "2 72 Pleadings cannot prove, even provisionally, a
plaintiffs case because a plaintiff has yet to have access to all relevant
facts in the case. Thus, Clark went on to explain:
[T]hrough the weapons of discovery and summary judgment
we have developed new devices, with more appropriate penal
ties to aid in matters of proof, and do not need to force the
pleadings to their less appropriate function . . . . There is cer
tainly no longer reason to force the pleadings to take the
place of proof, and to require other.ideas than simple concise
statements, free from the requirement of technical detail.2 73

271 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS § 66, at 458, § 68, at 470 (6th ed.
2002) ("The draftsmen of the Civil Rules proceeded on the conviction, based on experi
ence at common law and under the codes, that pleadings are not of great importance in a
lawsuit . . . . The keystone of the system of procedure embodied in the rules is Rule 8 . . . .
The other procedural devices of the rules-broad joinder, discovery, free amendment, and
summary judgment-rest on these provisions about pleadings.").
212 Clark, suj,ra note 25, at 977.
273 Id.; see also Charles E. Clark, Summary judgments, 2 F.R.D. 364, 366 ( 1943) ("(T] he
trend is to such simple forms of allegation and denial as are shown by the forms attached
to the new federal rules. . . . Under such a system of pleading, procedure for entering
summary judgments, for making pre-trial orders, and for extensive discovery before trial is
most valuable, if not indispensable . . . . These [devices] are the more necessary for prompt
and effective adjudication of litigation as we realize that the formal allegations of the par
ties in actual experience have never served this function . . . .").
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Of course, where subjective intent or state of mind is an element of
the claim, a plaintiff's complaint will be all the more unable to pre
sent proof with specificity, a fact that Rule 9(b) seems to acknowl
edge. 274 The Twombly standard confidently negle.cts all of this wisdom
by shifting to the plaintiff what amounts to a burden of proof at the
pleading stage. 275 Rather than benefiting from a presumption that a
generally alleged claim will be tested for support-after discovery-at
a later stage such as summary judgment, plaintiffs now must offer
their support up front prior to discovery. If plaintiffs fail to meet the
burden of marshalling facts that establish their asserted claims, the
complaint will be dismissed.
But identifying claims suspected of having shaky or insufficient
factual support is not the proper role of pleadings in our system.
Rather, the Federal Rules assign the function of screening out unsup
ported claims to later stages in the litigation. Specifically, the Court
has isolated the summary judgment device found in Rule 56 as the
appropriate mechanism for such screening:
Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the
Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a
defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient
claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from go
ing to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of
public and private resources. But with the advent of "notice
pleading," the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function
any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for
summary judgment. Rule 56 must be construed with due re
gard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and
defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims
274 FED. R. C1v. P. 9 (b) ( "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition · of mind of a
person may be averred generally."); see also Fairman, supra note 155, at 592 ( ''.By its very
nature, proof of a defendant's subjective intent is peculiarly in the defendant's own hands.
The Federal Rules recognize that pleading intent with specificiiy is both unworkable and
undesirable and explicitly allow intent to be averred generally.").
275 Richard Marcus offered the same description of the heightened pleading standards
that lower federal courts had come to embrace over the years:

The insistence on more details is really a demand for an offer of proof-some
specification of evidence that will raise an inference that the defendant's state
of mind was as alleged. This creation of a new burden of production effects a
subtle but real shift in the substantive law because plaintiff's lack of evidence
provides insufficient assurance that plaintiff in fact has no valid claim against
defendant.
Marcus, supra note 23, at 468 (citation omitted).
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and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the
manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims
and defenses have no factual basis.276
Or, as the Court said more recently and succinctly in Swierkiewicz,
"claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment
under Rule 56. The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8 (a) is the starting
point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus liti
gation on the merits of a claim. "277 It is particularly appropriate to vest
summar y judgment with the screening function given the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Rule 56 in 1986, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 218
after which parties carrying the burden at trial are obligated to bring
forward evidence supporting their claims when faced with a summary
judgment challenge.279
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is not the only device that al
lows courts to screen out claims lacking merit.28° First, the obligations
of Rule 11, as already discussed, require counsel and parties to do
some self-screening, being sure only to put forward claims that have
or are likely to have factual support and that have some arguable basis
in the law. 28 1 One can say then that the Twombly Court's statement that
the plausibility standard would make sure that there is a "'reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evi
dence"' in support of the claim282 steps directly on the toes of Rule 1 1
because under that rule counsel already are certifying that asserted

276 ulotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 327; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600
(1998) ("[S]ummary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstan
tial lawsuits prior to trial.").
277 Swierkiewia., 534 U.S. at 514; see also id. at 512 ('This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define dis
puted facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at
168 ("[F]ederal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of dis
covery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.").
278 477 U.S. 317.
279 Id. at 324 ("Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."').
280 Justice Stevens offers an extended recitation and review of the array of rules that
empower courts to manage and control litigation in a way that will preven't baseless clain1s
from progressing too far and imposing too much undue burden and expense. See Two mbly,
127 S. Ct. at 1987 n.13 (Stevens,] ., dissenting).
28 1 FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (b).
282 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (citations omitted).
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claims and allegations are warranted by the evidence or are likely to
have such support after discovery. 283
Second, under Rule 1 6, courts are given quite a free hand to
shape the issues in a case and eliminate frivolous claims, 284 an author
ity that is independent of the court's ability to dismiss claims under
Rule 1 2 (b) (6) or Rule 56. 285 Third, the scope of discovery has been
narrowed by the 2000 amendments to Rule 26. 286 Under that rule,
courts retain the authority to constrain discovery further to minimize
undue burden and expense in relation to the claims raised in the
case. 287 Each of these rules, in union with the summary judgment
rule, combine to provide powerful mechanisms for ensuring that
meritless claims do not proceed to trial. These tools also serve to en
sure that, to the extent that claims do proceed beyond the pleadings,
the costs and burdens incurred along the way can be minimized by
the court-for example, through the provision of limited discovery
on a single dispositive issue.
Rather than defer to these other devices as the proper screening
mechanisms, the Twombly Court rejects them as ineffective and turns
the entire system on its head by transforming the 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss into the front-end gatekeeper against groundless claims. By
requiring plaintiffs to offer factual allegations that report the factual
basis for their assertions of liability and to do so in a way that makes
liability plausible, the Twombly Court effectively has moved the sum
mary judgment evaluation up to the pleading stage. 288 The only dis
tinction is that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff's factual allegations
may simply be asserted rather than evidenced. But in both instances,
if the facts presented do not present a plausible picture of liability,
then the claims will not survive.

R. C1v. P. l l (b)(3).
R. C1v. P. 16(c)(l) ("At any conference under this rule consideration may be
given, and _the court may take appropriate action, with respect to the formulation and
simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses.").
285 See, e.g. , MacArthur v. San Juan County, No. 00-584, 2005 vVL 2716300, at *5 (D.
Utah Oct. 21, 2005) ("Pretrial identification of triable issues under Rule 16(c) (1) proceeds
under its own power, without reference to summary judgment under Rule 56 or any
'pleadings-only' analysis of legal sufficiency under Rule l 2 (b) (6).").
286 FED. R. C1v . P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments.
287 FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b) (2).
288 Cf Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, ]., dissenting) (" [I]t should go without say
ing in the wake of Siuierkiewicz. that a heightened production burden at the summary judg
ment stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.").
283 Frn.
284 FED.
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Such was the case in 1986, in Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v.
Z,enith Radio Corp.,289 in which the Supreme Court criticized a circuit
court reversal of summary judgment in an antitrust case because " [t]he
court apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to con
clude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent and not
conspiratorial. "290 The Supreme Court upheld the entry of summary
judgment because it did not believe that the claim of conspiracy was
plausible given facts that failed to establish "any plausible motive to en
gage in the conduct charged. "291 Twombly's dismissal echoes the ap
proach of the Matsushita Court: "when allegations of parallel conduct
are set out in order to make a § I claim, they must be placed in a con
text that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely par
allel conduct that could just as well be independent action. "292 Thus,
the Twombly Court is requiring no less than what it required of the Mat
sushita plaintiffs but now at the pleading stage: the 'presentation of facts
sufficient to set forth a plausible picture of liability.293 Such a return to
fact pleading narrows if not eviscerates the Court's previous delineation
between scrutiny under Rule 12(b) (6) and Rule 56, given the latter
rule's explicit command that parties responding to summary judgment
motions "must set forth specific facts" rather than the "mere allega
tions" that would be permissible at the complaint stage. 294
To the extent that Twombly endorses parity between the level of
scrutiny applied to claims at ·the Rule 1 2 (b) (6) and Rule 56 stages
with the only distinction being that between alleged facts and evi
denced facts-such a development is unwelcome. Such an approach
289 475 U.S. 574.
29o Id. at 581.
291 Id. at 596.
292 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (speaking of "[t]he need at the pleading stage for alle
gations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement").
293 Id.
294 FED. R. C1v. P. 56(e). The Supreme Court made this clear distinction, for example,
in Lujan u. Defenders of Wildlife:
At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presum [e]
that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim." [Lttjan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)) .
In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no
longer rest on such "mere allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or
other evidence "specific facts," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes
of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true . . . . " [Gladstone,
Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, l l 5 n.31 (1979)] .
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

488

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 49:431

would be wholly out of line with the original liberal vision of the rules
and would ultimately saddle plaintiffs in disfavored actions like anti
trust and civil rights claims with burdens they will have difficulty meet
ing. 295 Further, it is inappropriate to apply the type of scrutiny applied
at the summary judgment stage to the pleadings of litigants that have
yet to have access to discovery. As already noted, Rule 1 1 contem
plates that postcomplaint discovery will serve the purpose of supply
ing factual support that might have been lacking ex ante. 296 Such an
allowance is vital for plaintiffs pursuing those claims requiring evi
dence held only by the defendants. By imposing heightened plausibil
ity pleading on litigants in such circumstances, the Court makes it
possible that valid claims that could have found support through dis
covery never make it into the system, 297 a result never envisioned by
those who crafted the Federal Rules.
Although I reject plausibility pleading as a valid m�ans of weed
ing out meritless claims, it is worth acknowledging that the Supreme
Court's concerns surrounding the cost of modern litigation are le
gitimate and that something needs to be done to combat the prob
lems the Court identifies. 298 Indeed, a revision of civil pleading stan
dards may be an appropriate part of that solution. But requiring
plaintiffs to plead facts showing "plausible" entitlement to relief is not
the answer. Perhaps simply requiring the pleading of facts, without
taking the additional step of requiring facts that show plausibility
would be a useful innovation (if proposed by the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee.) . Such a change would prevent plaintiffs from relying on
wholly conclusory assertions of liability without permitting courts to
scrutinize whether those facts are sufficiently suggestive to allow fur
ther discovery. Even with this approach, however, plaintiffs faced with
information asymmetry -that is, an inability to identify direct evi
dence of wrongdoing at the pleading stage-would still have some

295 See Eric K Yamamoto, Efficiency 's Threat to the Value ofAccessible Courts for Minorities,
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 371-73 (1990) (discussing this issue in the civil rights con
text).
296 frn. R. C1v. P. l l (b)(3).
297 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 n.9 (2007) ("Any
heightened pleading rule, including Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b), could have the effect of
preventing a plaintiff from getting discovery on a claim that might have gone to a jury, had
discovery occurred and yielded substantial evidence.").
298 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966--67.
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difficulty going for ward. 299 To address that challenge, perhaps an
other piece of the solution would be to provide such plaintiffs with
the opportunity for very limited initial discovery to pursue such facts.
How would such plaintiffs be identified? Would it be appropriate for
the Rules to make such determinations based on the type of claim
asserted, for example whether the claim involves negligence or an an
titrust conspiracy ?
Whether these suggestions are good ideas or not is not the point.
Rather, the point is that the rising cost of complex litigation_:_ particu
larly in the class action context-is a valid concern and there may be a
way that civil pleading standards could be revised to address the issue.
As noted earlier, however, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee-in
consultation with the entire legal community-would be much better
suited to the task. 300 By taking the rules as a whole into account and
by balancing the interests of defendants desiring to avoid unwar
ranted litigation expenses and the interests of plaintiffs pressing po
tentially valid claims, the Committee is better suited to develop a nu
anced solution to address the issue in a targeted fashion. It is in that
regard that the Court's new plausibility standard falls short.
IV. PLEADING PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD: FUNCTIONAL PLEADING
If it is improper to require a complaint to present factual detail
that sets forth a plausible picture of liability, what can we expect from
pleadings? What is their proper function? Charles Clark offered the
following suggestion: 'We can expect [from pleadings] a general state
ment distinguishing the case from all others, so that the manner and
form of trial and remedy expected are clear, and so that a permanent
judgment will result."301 From this simple statement one can discern a
proper understanding of the generalized pleading system intended by
Rule 8(a) (2) . Rather than terming this system "notice" pleading, the
term functional pleading is more useful to focus attention on the pur
poses behind requiring the complaint to provide notice and thereby
isolate the proper circumstances under which a complaint should be
deemed to have failed to state a claim. 302 Under a functional pleading
299 See Posting of Randy Picker to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/11/reading_twombly.html (Nov. 28, 2006,
09:46 AM) (defining "information asymmetry" as "what I know that you don't know").
300 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168; see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595.
30! Clark, supra note 25, at 977.
302 Charles Clark, early in the history of the Federal Rules, emphasized that the con
cept of "notice pleading" had to be given greater definition based on the underlying pur-
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system, stating the claim in a complaint fulfills the overarching function
of notice, but the purpose of doing so is primarily twofold: to give the
defendant something to which to respond (the instigation function)
and to identify the nature and contours of the dispute for purposes of
discovery, judicial case management, determination of the jury right,303
and res judicata304 (the framing function) . 305 I would allow that a com
plaint serves a third function, not by design but rather in response to a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) . That is, the complaint permits
the defendant and the court to identify facially inv alid claims that
should be dismissed (to be distinguished from "implausible," "unsup
- portable" or "groundless" claims) , something one might call the filtering
function. A failure of the complaint on this latter count is the measure
of whether it properly states a claim.
Speaking, then, to the filtering function, it should be understood
that by filtering I do not mean to suggest that groundless or implausi
ble claims are to be identified at the pleading stage as suggested by the
Twombly Court. We have already discussed the impropriety of that type
of screening at the pleading stage. 306 Rather, the filter is one that is set
to screen out only those complaints that assert as wrongdoing conduct
that is clearly lawful. Put differently, the only way in which such a state
ment of a claim should be able to fail is if it conclusiv ely reveals the ab
sence of a claim on its face. 307 Conversely, a complaint that alleges
poses that the pleadings were intended to serve: The usual modern expression, at least of
text writers, is to refer to the notice function of pleadings; notice of the case to the parties,
the court, and the persons interested. This is a sound approach so far as it goes; but con
tent must still be given to the word "notice." Clark, supra note 20, at 460.
303 Id. at 457 (stating that pleadings will "show the type of case brought, so that it may
be assigned to the proper form of trial, whether by the jury in negligence or contract, or to
a court, referee, or master, as in foreclosure, divorce, accounting, and so on").
304 See id. at 456--57 ("[Pleadings] must sufficiently differentiate tl1e situation of fact
which is being litigated from all other situations to allow of the application of the doctrine
of :res judicata, whereby final adjudication of this particular case will end the controversy
forever.").
305 Richard Marcus has properly noted that the liberality of amendments and the abil
ity of courts to define the issues via pretrial orders minimizes the importance of the fram
ing function of the pleadings. See Marcus, supra note 31, at 1756 ("[P] Ieadings set the pa
rameters for the ensuing litigation of the case. The scope of discovery and relevance
rulings at trial depend on what the pleadings place in issue . . . . [I] ncreased judicial man
agement means that pretrial orders often supersede the pleadings, and the liberality of
amendment also shows that setting outside limitations for the scope of litigation is not an
important objective for pleading practice." (citation omitted)).
306 See sup ra notes 271-300 and accompanying text.
307 Marcus, supra note 23, at 493 ("The circumstances in which . . . merits decisions are
possible on the pleadings . . . are distressingly limited. . . . [S]uch situations fall generally
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wrongdoing-even if done conclusorily with only skeletal facts-should
suffice regardless of whether the plaintiff has identified any facts expli
cating the conclusory legal terms in the complaint. When the defect in
the complaint is that it lacks sufficient detail, that is a defect that un
dermines the instigation and framing functions of the complaint. In
other words, a complaint with insufficient detail either fails to give
enough information to enable the defendant to "frame a responsive
pleading" -something that should be a rarity 308-or is insufficiently
precise to reliably delimit the scope of the allegations so that discovery
may remain within certain bounds. The appropriate remedy for such
defects is the grant of a motion for a more definite statement, 309 not
dismissal of the claim. 310 The defendant, then, is entitled to look to the
pleadings for notice, but must rely on seeking more information rather
than a dismissal when such notice is lacking.
An illustration will clarify the expectations of functional pleading.
If a complaint alleged, ''The defendant committed a battery against me
on June 1 , 2007, causing personal injuries for which I seek $100,000 in
into lwo categories, those in which more detail will reveal a fatal defect and those in which
sufficient detail will show that the defendalll has nol violated the plaintiffs rights.").
'°8 See Fairman, suf,ra note 9, al 992-93 ( "In the r-are case where a complaint is too
vague to provide a defendant notice to prepare a responsive pleading, Rule 12(e) provides
the tool for clarity."). After all, a defendant requires only sufficient detail to frame a re
sponsive pleading (consisting of admissions and denials), not to build its case. See Marcus,
supra note 31, at 1756 ("[I]t is hard to believe that defendants will find it difficult to deny
plaintiffs allegations because the complaint is vague, and defendant's ability to assert af
firmative defenses turns little on the clarity of the complaint."). Even in Bell Atlantic Corf,. v.
Twombly, the majority's suggestion that defendants would not know where to begin to re
spond to plaintiffs' concluso.ry allegations, see 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970 n.10 (2007), is not
credible. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, "A defendant could, of course, begin
by either denying or admitting the charge." Id. at 1987 n.12 (Stevens, ]., dissenting). Dis
covery, not the pleadings, is the mechanism for collecting sufficient details to build one's
defense. See, e.g. , Fed. Air Marshals v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 484, 488 (Fed. Cl. 2006)
("Defendant also requests that this court grant its Motion For A More Definite Statement
and require plaintiffs to specify during which pay periods they received insufficient com
pensation. . . . Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their claim for overtime compensation
for the years during which defendant failed to comply with Fl.SA. Considering defendant
has control over these records itself, il can easily access those documents during discovery
and better.establish the time periods in question.").
309 FED. R. C1v. P. 12(e); see al.so Marcus, supra note 31, at 1755-56 (" [P] leading mo
tions may serve to assure the defendant of notice of the basis for the suit. The criteria for
the motion for a more definite statement are keyed precisely to this objective . . . ." (cita
tion omitted)).
310 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1985 n.9 (Stevens, ]., dissenting) ( "The remedy for an al
legation lacking sufficient specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 12(e)
motion for a more definite statement." (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2002))).
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damages," it could not be denied that unlawful conduct has been de
scribed and the defendant has been identified as the culprit. Of course,
we do not know anything about the factual basis of the claim or
whether it has any merit; it is a bald and unsupported conclusory asser
tion. Nevertheless, if the allegation in the complaint is true, that is, if it
is true that the defendant committed battery against the plaintiff, then
the plaintiff is indeed entitled to some relief.
How could a defendant respond to this claim? He could enter an
answer deny ing the allegation in the complaint and proceed with dis
covery. Discovery would reveal the factual basis of the plaintiff's claim.
If those facts do not actually make out a case of battery, the defendant
could then move for summary judgment. Many courts would likely
permit an alternative response, a motion for a more definite state
ment arguing that the complaint is too ambiguous to permit a re
sponsive pleading. Although the defendant may be genuinely inter
ested in what conduct the plaintiff is referring to in asserting that the
defendant committed battery against her, such information does not
seem to be essential to responding with an admission or a denial.
Nevertheless, if a court did require a more definite statement in this
instance and the plaintiff revealed that the underlying conduct for
the battery was a harsh stare, that would give the defendant a basis for
moving to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b) (6) by arguing that such
conduct does not constitute battery under the applicable law. Used in
this way, the motion for a more definite statement would be a useful
means of uncovering and eliminating facially invalid claims. 311
Translated to the antitrust context, a comparable allegation would
be: "During 2007 the defendants conspired and entered an agreement
to restrain trade in the telecommunications market in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act." The defendants certainly could form a response
to such a charge; if they feel that they did not reach any such agree311 See Marcus, supra note 31, at 1759 (" [A] s a means for ferreting out a fatal fact in the
plaintiff's claim, [a motion for a more definite statement] can foster merits decisions.") . It
seems to me that, strictly speaking, this would not be a proper use of Rule 12(e) because
that rule is only properly invoked when the defendant cannot respond with an admission
or denial, which in our example is not the case. See 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1376 (3d ed. 2004) ( " [T] here should be
a bias against the use of the Rule 12(e) motion as a precursor to a Rule 12(b) (6) motion
or as a method for seeking out a threshold defense. This practice is not authorized by the
language of the rule . . . . ") . However, given courts' substantial case management authority
under Rule 16, courts would certainly be able to ferret out this information on their own
to evaluate the validity of claims and thus there may be li�tle offence in permitting defen
dants to instigate such scrutiny via the motion for a more definite statement.
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ment, they should simply deny the claim, proceed with discovery, and
seek summar y judgment if they feel that the factual basis for the claim
is insufficient. Alternatively, a motion for a more definite statement
might reveal that the conspiracy is rooted in observed parallel conduct,
the anticompetitive statement of one of the defendants, and a belief
that during meetings among the defendants they actually entered into
an agreement to restrain trade in the manner alleged. Such a clarifica
tion would give enough specification to focus discovery in a way that
litigants could investigate whether there was evidence to support the
allegation of an agreement. But as Rule 11 (b) confirms, the plaintiff
cannot be required at the complaint stage to articulate facts that they
could only learn of and gain access to via discovery. 31 2 Thus it would be
inappropriate to dismiss the above hypothetical complaint after the
motion for a more definite statement because the plaintiff might be
able to adduce facts that would support liability.
The Twombly Court's ultimate judgment was that because the
above-prescribed course of action would permit the initiation of costly
discovery, 313 the pleading standard needed to be tweaked in a way that
would require plaintiffs to plead supporting facts that demonstrate
liability first: "a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidenti
fied point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality."314 As dis
cussed above, such a concern is unwarranted given other provisions in
place to control litigation expense. Further, this concern is more
properly vindica'ted through the ordinary rules amendment proc
ess. 31 5 The relevant point here is that a functional view of pleadings,
focused exclusively on whether a complaint has properly fulfilled its
instigation, framing, and limited filtering functions, would be helpful
in cabining court scrutiny of complaints to its proper scope.
CONCLUSION

Under plausibility pleading, rather than simply being required to
state a claim, plaintiffs must now plead "enough facts to state a claim
312 FED. R. C1v. P. 1 1 (b) (3) .
313 Two mbly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 ("Probably, then , it is only by taking care to require alle
gations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the [dis
covery] process will reveal relevant evidence to support a § 1 claim." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) ) .
314 Id. at 1966.
31 5 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515; Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 1 63, 1 68-69 ( 1993)..
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to relief that is plausible on its face. "316 When pleaded facts are consis
tent beth with lawful and unlawful conduct, the pleader must include
additional factual context that supports the idea that the conduct was
unlawful. No longer are courts barred from dismissing a claim "unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief' -the Court, in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, has put that language to rest.317
The new plausibility standard, which is being and will continue to
be applied by lower courts outside the antitrust context, bodes ill for
plaintiffs who will now have to muster facts showing plausibility when
such facts may be unavailable to them. Ultimately, Twombly raises the
pleading bar to a point where it will inevitably screen out claims that
could have been proven if given the chance. In doing so, the interests
of protecting defendants against expensive discovery and managing
burdensome caseloads were permitted to prevail over the interests of
access and resolution on the merits that procedure's original liberal
ethos was designed to promote. Indeed, one may legitimately ques
tion whether the liberal ethos finds any remaining refuge in proce
dure, having lost one of its last perches within the area of pleading.
Perhaps the nature of modern complex litigation has changed
sufficiently beyond the level addressed by the original drafters of the
Federal Rules such that a revision in pleading standards is warranted
if not long overdue. Open-access pleading has its downsides, 318 not
the least of which is the easy ability under the American Rule to im
pose litigation expense on defendants with relative impunity in the
absence of an attentive managerial judge. Amending the rules had
been the means used to address such concerns and it is unclear why
the Supreme Court acted outside of the amendment process to effect
this most recent change. Perhaps formalizing plausibility pleading in
the language of an amended rule would be too tricky a task, too con
troversial, or too much of an official departure from notice pleading.
After all, the Twombly Court, as made clear in Erickson v. Pardus, likes
to believe that notice pleading lives on and that not much has
changed. Charles Clark would see things a bit differently I am sure.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated l7y Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
m See Subrin, supra note 14, at 975-1000 (discussing the challenges of flexible equity
inspired rules-including liberal pleading and joinder rules-when applied to actions at
law).
316
317

